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Face the Facts, or Is the Face a Fact?:
Biometric Privacy in Publicly Available
Data
Daniel Levin*
Recent advances in biometric technologies have caused a stir
among the privacy community. Specifically, facial recognition technologies facilitated through data scraping practices have called into
question the basic precepts we had around exercising biometric privacy. Yet, in spite of emerging case law on the permissibility of data
scraping, comparatively little attention has been given to the privacy
implications endemic to such practices.
On the one hand, privacy proponents espouse the view that manipulating publicly available data from, for example, our social media profiles, derogates from users’ expectations around the kind of
data they share with platforms (and the obligations such platforms
have for protecting users from illicit uses of that data). On the other
hand, free speech absolutists take the stance that, to the extent that
biometric data is readily apparent in publicly available data, any
restrictions on its secondary uses are prior restraints on speech.
This Note proposes that these principles underlying privacy and
free speech are compatible. Wholesale bans on biometric technologies misapprehend their legitimate uses for actually preserving privacy. Despite the overwhelming dearth of protections for biometric
privacy across the United States, current battles to preserve the few
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regulations on these data practices illuminate the emerging frontier
for privacy and free speech debates.
As this Note concludes, existing regulations on biometric data
practices withstand First Amendment scrutiny, and strike the appropriate balance between speech and privacy regulations.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1011
I. PRIVACY NORMS, INVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES ..... 1018
II. THE LIMITS TO EXISTING PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS ..................................................... 1023
A. State Attorneys General ............................... 1024
B. Federal Trade Commission .......................... 1025
C. Inadequacies for Protecting Consumers ...... 1029
III. BIOMETRIC
INFORMATION
PRIVACY
ACT:
A HISTORY ......................................................... 1032
A. Clearview
AI
and
Biometric
Data
Collection ..................................................... 1036
B. Clearview AI’s BIPA Litigation ................... 1042
C. Privacy Harms, Tangible Harms ................. 1043
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND BIOMETRIC DATA
COLLECTION ...................................................... 1045
A. Matter of Public Concern ............................ 1049
1. Algorithms as Subjects, Not Speech ..... 1054
2. Government Surveillance Insights ........ 1056
B. Viewpoint Discrimination ............................ 1059
C. Data Collection Is Speech-Related Conduct 1064
CONCLUSION....................................................................... 1067

INTRODUCTION
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg ushered in the past decade
with an omen: privacy is no longer a social norm.1 Perhaps more a
promise than a prophecy, Zuckerberg’s declaration follows a now1

Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010, 8:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy [https://perma.cc/RXY2-52RR].
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familiar line among technology’s giants. He may be right that we no
longer take privacy for granted, but by no means was this inevitable.
Nor does it follow that users idly capitulated to their privacy’s deprivation. On the contrary, platforms disempower users from exercising entitlement over their privacy.2 They play an indispensable role
in shaping our privacy norms, employing covert language that gestures us toward greater disclosures and, by extension, greater insecurities.3 At a more fundamental level, they contribute powerful interpretations toward otherwise amorphous concepts like “public”

2

See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE
DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 42 (2018) (“Once design affects our perceptions, it begins
to shape our behavior. Once it shapes our behavior, it can be used to control us because it
shapes what we perceive as normal. And once norms are established, they are difficult to
change.”); Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROT. L.
REV. 423, 426 (2018) (arguing that service providers use product design to constrain
consumer choices).
3
See, e.g., Helen A.S. Popkin, Privacy Is Dead on Facebook. Get Over It., NBC NEWS
(Jan. 13, 2010, 8:56 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna34825225 [https://perma.cc/
D86R-KG7T] (citing Facebook’s previous privacy guide, which provided, “Making
connections—finding people you know, learning about people, searching for what people
are saying about topics that interest you—is at the core of our product. This can only
happen when people make their information available and choose to share more openly.”);
Anabel Pasarow, How to Get More Matches on OKCupid, According to an Expert,
REFINERY29 (May 15, 2019, 3:55 PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/okcupidprofile-questions-matches [https://perma.cc/KHE7-MK8W] (“When you add a new picture
or a little anecdote, the algorithm treats you like a new user and shows you more
people . . . . And the more questions you answer, the more you’re improving your chances
at making matches, so it’s in your interest to answer more questions.”); Mary Papenfuss,
Massive Tinder Photo Grab Is Latest Scary Warning to Be Careful What You Post,
HUFFPOST (Apr. 30, 2017, 4:41 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/04/30/massivetinder-photo-grab-is-latest-scary-warning-to-be-careful_a_22063020/
[https://perma.cc/E6CQ-ESHS] (discussing compilation of a data set used to power a facial
recognition program based on data scraped from Tinder); Natasha Singer & Aaron Krolik,
Grindr and OKCupid Spread Personal Details, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/technology/grindr-apps-dating-data-tracking.html
[https://perma.cc/4WVS-ESJX] (Oct. 14, 2021) (discussing how dating websites solicit
questions about recreational drug use, HIV status, and last STI testing date and market user
responses to third parties); Bumble Privacy Policy, BUMBLE, https://bumble.com/privacy
[https://perma.cc/7RUB-RBE6] (“We think our Users are awesome, and we want you to
share how awesome you are with the world, so we have built certain features to enable
this.…When using the Bumble App, you should assume that anything you post or submit
on the App may be publicly-viewable and accessible, both by Users and non-users of the
App.”).
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and “private” information.4 Yet lay people—even unsuspecting
youth—bear the brunt of these norm transformations, making for
convenient scapegoats to shield these platforms from accountability.5
Against this backdrop, these norms situate a new tale for a new
age. Contemporary facial recognition software relies on the breadth
of information available on social media networks to generate surveillance technologies.6 Using sophisticated algorithms, this software collects unprecedented levels of biometric data from our photographs, exceeding the amount of information available in either
police departments’ or the FBI’s existing databases.7
4

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1 (2008) (“Privacy…is a concept
in disarray. Nobody can articulate what it means.”); Woodrow Hartzog, The Public
Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 459, 465 (2019) (“[N]obody knows what ‘public’
means, because it has no set definition in law or policy. Appeals to the public nature of
information to justify surveillance and data practices are often just guesswork. At worst,
appeals to the public nature of information and acts provide cover for unscrupulous and
dangerous data practices and surveillance by making it seem as though there is some
objective and established criteria for what constitutes public information. There is no such
consensus.”).
5
Privacy norms are often reduced to generational divides. These arguments
misconstrue norms’ historicity, namely their ability to respond to and emerge from
historical forces. This is to say: norms are neither accidental nor incidental; they are
deliberate effects predicated on power asymmetries. See, e.g., Emily Nussbaum, Say
Everything, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 2, 2007), https://nymag.com/news/features/27341/ (last
visited Mar. 19, 2022) (“But in the past ten years, a new set of values has sneaked in to
take its place, erecting another barrier between young and old. And as it did in the fifties,
the older generation has responded with a disgusted, dismissive squawk. It goes something
like this: Kids today. They have no sense of shame. They have no sense of privacy. They
are show-offs, fame whores, pornographic little loons who post their diaries, their phone
numbers, their stupid poetry—for God’s sake, their dirty photos!—online. They have
virtual friends instead of real ones. They talk in illiterate instant messages. They are
interested only in attention—and yet they have zero attention span, flitting like
hummingbirds from one virtual stage to another.”).
6
See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know
It, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacyfacial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/6GVW-UQKL] (Nov. 2, 2021).
7
In its marketing materials, Clearview AI provides its prospective clients—typically
law enforcement agencies—with a chart, demonstrating the extent of searchable photos in
its database relative to other prominent agencies. Whereas the FBI contains 411 million
searchable photos, Clearview’s database contains three billion photos. Id.; see also David
Kravets, Smile, You’re in the FBI Face-Recognition Database, ARS TECHNICA (June 18,
2016, 3:50 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/06/smile-youre-in-the-fbi-facerecognition-database/ [https://perma.cc/R54E-CPTW].
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The irony is uncanny. Emergent shifts in algorithmic development and machine learning enable companies to manipulate platforms’ promises about the accessibility of public information to facilitate surveillance creep. By converting our faces into “facial geometries,” these technologies reduce us to calculi that render us both
known and knowable.8 They function to the extent that gaps in privacy law weigh in favor of corporate actors’ definitions of public
information, allowing near-impenetrable analogies to Google’s
search features. Indeed, our industry giants reaped what they sowed,
laying fertile grounds for more insidious forms of surveillance to
pervade our day-to-day experiences and limit our options for refuge.9 In short, we have internalized surveillance as a norm and quieted the possibility to exercise alternative subjectivities.10
Whereas the European Union has established a robust regulatory
scheme, culminating with the passage of the General Data Protection Regulation in 2018, the United States remains bereft of any such
federal protections. This deficit in protection enables companies to
engage in privacy intrusions with relative impunity. For a while, this
8

JOSEPH PUGLIESE, BIOMETRICS: BODIES, TECHNOLOGIES, BIOPOLITICS 112–13 (2010)
(“In biometrics, [the] iterable and repeatable identity form can never be identical across
each instance of its repetition . . . . In other words, the unique identity biometric of a subject
is indissociably tied to iterability, as ‘the logic that ties repetition to alterity.’…A subject’s
biometric ‘root identity’ is, however, in keeping with the rhetorical effects of this
rhizomatic trope, always caught within a transversal movement of iterability that precludes
the possibility of an authoritative self-identity not always already marked by difference.”).
9
The late French philosopher, Michel Foucault, provided an astute insight that
foreshadowed the scale of mass surveillance today. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books
2d ed. 1995) (1977). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault employed Jeremy Bentham’s
architectural design for a prison—popularly known today as the panopticon—to argue that
surveillance disciplines us into docility. Id. at 184–85 (“The examination combines the
techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgement. It is a
normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish.
It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges
them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of discipline, the examination is highly ritualized.
In it are combined the ceremony of power and the form of the experiment, the deployment
of force and the establishment of truth. At the heart of the procedures of discipline, it
manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of
those who are subjected. The superimposition of the power relations and knowledge
relations assumes in the examination all its visible brilliance.”).
10
Foucault put the matter nicely when he said, “surveillance is permanent in its effects,
even if it is discontinuous in its action.” Id. at 201.
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only benefitted companies directly because, as the FTC’s enforcement mechanisms demonstrate, the law privileges privacy policies
to determine whether companies fulfilled their contractual obligations. In other words, absent federal protections, privacy remains a
self-governing regime that allays meaningful choice and enforces a
regulative ideal that users can and do read privacy policies, evaluate
available choices, and make informed decisions. The reality, to
which many can anecdotally attest, is that users do not expend the
time or energy to read, let alone understand, privacy policies. More
critically, it seems dubious that reading and understanding how platforms collect data will inure to any substantive policy overhauls.11
Recognizing the inadequacy of federal protections, states began
passing legislation that responded to legitimate concerns about companies’ inconspicuous data collection.12 One such exemplary piece
of legislation is Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act
(“BIPA”).13 BIPA requires that companies receive users’ informed
consent before processing their biometric data.14 Unlike many other
privacy laws, BIPA does not defer to state attorneys general to forward any litigation. It empowers individuals with a private right of
action.15 But, because BIPA operates within the notice-and-consent
regime, it has the inverse effect of incentivizing companies to fabricate users’ consent.16
11

See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, The Pathologies of Digital Consent, 96
WASH. U. L. REV. 1461, 1500 (2019) (“[C]onsent regimes burden data subjects with all of
the risks of understanding and self-protection while keeping the data machine humming.
Consent does not scale without losing its legitimacy. The control that consent regimes
promise us ends up being illusory and overwhelming. Even when companies are
transparent, it doesn’t lead to reform. Big tech platforms and shadowy advertising
companies make their fortunes while the rest of us are watched, nudged, exploited, and
exposed to data breaches and the manipulation of politics and elections.”).
12
See, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 503.001 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020
(2017); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1)(K)(2) (2018); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
13
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1.
14
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15.
15
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20.
16
Woodrow Hartzog, BIPA: The Most Important Biometric Privacy Law in the US?, in
REGULATING BIOMETRICS: GLOBAL APPROACHES AND URGENT QUESTIONS 96, 103 (Amba
Kak ed., 2020), https://ainowinstitute.org/regulatingbiometrics.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2J6V-NR66] (“BIPA allows companies to exploit people as their consent is harvested
through systems designed to have them hurriedly click ‘I Agree’ and get on with their busy
lives.”).
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Platforms are now backpedaling their initial investments into
privacy deprivation, motivated in part by the diminution of their
control over users’ public data.17 In February, Google, YouTube,
Venmo, and LinkedIn sent cease-and-desist letters to Clearview AI,
alleging that the company violated their terms of use in derogation
of their users’ privacy expectations by collecting their photos.18
However, these platforms structured the very norms that enabled
Clearview to adopt its verbiage in the first place. Now, they not only
struggle to reclaim their monopoly over our information from state
regulations, but also from other companies like Clearview, who invert these platforms’ promises to further their own ends.19
Consumer-focused privacy protections are fighting an uphill
battle. Both platforms and their rivals are engrossed in efforts to assert dominion over our public information, deploying an array of
legislative and judicial artillery. All the while, our privacy over information—and ourselves—suffers the fate of this attrition warfare.
As consumers leverage BIPA against Clearview to redress considerable biometric privacy intrusions, the company elicits
17

See, e.g., Cory Doctorow, Facebook Is Going After Its Critics in the Name of Privacy,
WIRED (Nov. 20, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facebook-is-going-afterits-critics-in-the-name-of-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/Q2JY-2QUH].
18
Google, YouTube, Venmo and LinkedIn Send Cease-and-Desist Letters to Facial
Recognition App that Helps Law Enforcement, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/clearview-ai-google-youtube-send-cease-and-desist-letter-to-facial-recognition-app/
[https://perma.cc/K78W-Z2BQ] (Feb. 5, 2020, 6:52 PM) [hereinafter Companies’ Ceaseand-Desist Letters].
19
Consumer advocates argue that platforms’ recent push for federal privacy laws are
less concerned with privacy protections than they are with reinstating platforms’ control
over their own data collection processes. Their lobbying efforts aim to disempower users
from private rights of action and pursue state law preemption in light of recent costly
litigation. See Bennett Cyphers, Big Tech’s Disingenuous Push for a Federal Privacy Law,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/09/bigtechs-disingenuous-push-federal-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/E3WX-PRF2]; see also
Issie Lapowsky, Facebook’s Plan for Privacy Laws? ‘Co-creating’ Them with Congress,
PROTOCOL (July 14, 2020), https://www.protocol.com/facebook-privacy-laws-white-paper
[https://perma.cc/6YJT-X5D2] (“Facebook pushes for a light-touch approach to privacy
regulation that involves maximum input from and flexibility for businesses . . . . It argues,
for instance, that the best way to design privacy regulations is through ‘policy co-creation,’
in which governments and companies work together to prototype policies and test their
viability before they’re implemented. It makes a case for regulations that ‘avoid or remove
strict, one-size-fits-all design requirements,’ opting instead for laws that ‘regulate the
process for making privacy design decisions, not the outcome of those processes.’”).
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constitutional interests to defend its practice, arguing that it has a
First Amendment right to public information.20 What it omits—
quite crucially—is what it has a right to do in relationship with that
information, and whether that information is truly public.21 These
questions concern more than intellectual fodder; they imagine technology’s enduring force to shape legal inquiry.
This Note considers these issues in four parts. Part I provides a
theoretical backdrop to privacy and situates overlaps and inconsistencies between privacy literature and its legal counterparts, drawing
tensions between privacy norms and judicial interpretations of such
norms. Part II describes existing legal infrastructures for data privacy enforcement in the United States and queries the adequacy of
such enforcement mechanisms in light of tangible consumer privacy
harms. Part III discusses Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy
Act, using the legislation as a proxy for describing the importance
of and limits to consumer self-help mechanisms to defend their biometric privacy against facial recognition technologies. Part IV analyzes First Amendment concerns relating to data privacy, concluding that biometric data collection exceeds the scope of First Amendment protections on legal and policy grounds.

20

Alfred Ng, Clearview AI Says the First Amendment Lets It Scrape the Internet.
Lawyers Disagree, CNET (Feb. 6, 2020, 12:13 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/
clearview-says-first-amendment-lets-it-scrape-the-internet-lawyers-disagree/
[https://perma.cc/Q35C-KCQJ].
21
As this Note argues, the overemphasis on public information suggests a misguided
precept about the First Amendment’s jurisprudence. It may very well be that “data speaks,”
but the First Amendment does not protect speech as such; it protects speech relative to its
content and context. For a descriptive account of whether data speaks, see Jane Bambauer,
Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 70 (2014) (“Data communicates. It tells a narrative
just as effectively as prose, imagery, and music to those with the training to interpret it. Its
style is dry, but this does not interfere with its ability to light up the mind. A database can
be interpreted directly by a person with the help of a codebook, and it can also be translated
into other more familiar forms of expression like maps, charts, graphs, and descriptive
sentences. Lest there be any doubt about data’s intimate connection to other forms of
expression, one may recall that the very first form of writing was data: the accounting
records of traders in ancient Mesopotamia. Data provided the building blocks of the rest of
written language.”).
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I. PRIVACY NORMS, INVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Privacy scholarship carries a longstanding history in the United
States. In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their
seminal article, The Right to Privacy, which laid the foundation for
modern privacy law.22 Establishing privacy as “the right to be let
alone,”23 Warren and Brandeis mounted an assault against rampant
intrusions by the press.24 While their concerns may be read as universal, a more honest reading reveals their defense of a high-class
sensibility.25 By disclosing the province of their solitude, the press
revealed more than the wealthy’s lavish fineries; it offered a glimpse
into precisely what made them like everyone else.26
Warren and Brandeis’s lasting legacy is owed to more than their
genius. The Right to Privacy set the stage for contemporary privacy
issues. It alluded to an inversion of matters’ relative importance,
where the disclosure of otherwise trivial things garnered the public’s
attention.27 For Warren and Brandeis, such disclosures do not
merely respond to moral values and social standards; they also inform them.28
22

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890). Cf. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (laying the
foundation for four privacy torts).
23
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 195.
24
Id. at 196 (“The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of
propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious,
but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.”).
25
See ARI WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST 16 (2018); Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of
Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2010) (“Old norms of
deference and respect seemed under assault, and there was great anxiety among elites keen
on protecting their status, authority, and privacy.”).
26
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 196 (“To satisfy a prurient taste the details of
sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by
intrusion upon the domestic circle.”).
27
Id. (“In this, as in other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand. Each
crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct
proportion to its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of morality. Even
gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is potent for evil. It
both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative importance of things, thus
dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people. When personal gossip attains the dignity
of print, and crowds the space available for matters of real interest to the community, what
wonder that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance.”).
28
Id.

2022]

FACE THE FACTS

1019

But Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy—much like
all conceptions of privacy—engendered particular norms.29 Indeed,
any meaningful engagement with privacy must not only ask what
privacy is, but also what privacy does.30 Competing understandings
of privacy do not emerge for purely intellectual inquiry. Rather, they
seek to enable certain rights for some at the expense of others.31
In her recent work, Susan Hazeldean identified a diversity of
current philosophical conceptions of privacy.32 Among them, she
considered privacy as: a “right to be let alone”;33 a means to limit
access to the self;34 a safeguard of intimacy;35 a right to control information;36 a defense for personhood;37 and protection for social
networks.38 In addition to Hazeldean’s succinct yet comprehensive

29

See WALDMAN, supra note 25, at 16.
See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2005) (noting that the right to privacy has been “poorly articulated”
and “vaguely theorized,” resulting in incoherent definitions of privacy).
31
See generally Susan V. Hazeldean, Privacy as Pretext, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1719
(2019) (arguing that privacy has historically been used to justify unequal treatment of
women and LGBTQ people). It helps to illustrate this historical element of privacy further.
In State v. Rhodes, the court refused to indict a man for striking his wife several times
without provocation, finding that courts should refrain from interfering with domestic
affairs, including domestic violence. 61 N.C. 453, 454–55 (1868). The court recognized
the sovereignty of the marital unit, calling it a “family government . . . as complete in itself
as the State government is in itself.” Id. at 456. In their reasoning, they determined that the
“evils of ill temper” cannot compare with “the evils which would result from raising the
curtain, and exposing to public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the bed chamber.”
Id. at 457. They considered their ruling to favor neither husband nor wife, and to preserve
the “modesty and purity” of the middle class, asking, “[w]hat could be more harassing to
them, or injurious to society, than to draw a crowd around their seclusion?” Id. at 458.
Although the case bears little significance today, it is useful to consider how courts have
weaponized privacy to reify existing social norms and produce privacy winners and losers.
32
See Hazeldean, supra note 31, at 1721.
33
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 195.
34
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 423 (1980).
35
Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 280 (1977).
36
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also id. at 24–25 (“Privacy is
the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.”).
37
J. Braxton Craven, Jr., Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone, 1976 DUKE L.J. 699,
702 (1976).
38
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919,
970 (2005).
30
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list, privacy has also been popularly understood as contextual.39
These theories of privacy function as more than abstract inquiries.
They determine how we operate under given circumstances40 and
represent an affirmative commitment to self-determination; that is,
they calculate the parameters of how we render ourselves both legible and intelligible to others.41 But they also calibrate the extent of
how we define ourselves to others.
In this sense, it may be untenable to consider how privacy preserves a unified “self.” As Jeffrey Rosen wrote:
Privacy protects us from being misdefined and
judged out of context in . . . a world in which information can easily be confused with knowledge. True
knowledge of another person is the culmination of a
slow process of mutual revelation.42
We curate images of ourselves to show to others, but it seems doubtful that every person with whom we interact shares the same understanding of who we are. Our colleagues, friends, families, and lovers
each conceptualize us based on their unique evaluations of our interactions with them and others, as well as our recreational interests
and professional endeavors, to name a few.43 To the extent that we
39

SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 9; see also id. at 98 (“By understanding privacy as shaped
by the norms of society, we can better see why privacy should not be understood solely as
an individual right . . . . Instead, privacy protects the individual because of the benefits it
confers on society.”).
40
WESTIN, supra note 36, at 7 (“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others.”).
41
See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 989–1000 (2003) (discussing how privacy
protections advance the interests of individual autonomy, democratic self-governance, and
the marketplace of ideas).
42
JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA 8
(2000).
43
See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 26,
30 (1976) (“One shares more of himself with a friend than with an employer, more with a
life-long friend than with a casual friend, more with a lover than an acquaintance.”).
Reiman’s construction of how we exercise discretion over who may know “more” about
us offers a valuable contribution, though I argue that it misapprehends the prevailing
qualitative nature of information-sharing. For example, modern dating applications have
internal cultures that circumscribe their respective privacy norms. We would not ordinarily
consider sharing romantic or sexual affinities part of our common parlance—at least among
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are constituted through these social relations, it makes more sense
to consider privacy as a precursor to defining and maintaining our
“selves.”44
Over a century ago, Warren and Brandeis foresaw the precise
question that burdens the current privacy debate: to how much privacy are we entitled without interfering with the freedom of speech
and expression? For them, the inversion of relative importance
through publication in the press ascribed too much value to matters
of a trivial nature. They wrote, “[w]hen personal gossip attains the
dignity of print . . . no one can be surprised that it usurps the place
of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at
once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling.”45 In short, privacy enables the precondition for thinking, such that meaningful expression becomes possible.46 Neil Richards popularly termed this
phenomenon “intellectual privacy,” arguing that “[t]he ability to
freely make up our minds and to develop new ideas . . . depends
upon a substantial measure of intellectual privacy.”47
But there is also another component in Warren and Brandeis’s
argument that contributes to intellectual privacy. Thinking—or worrying—about a lack of privacy requires substantial mental expenditure. The time and energy spent thinking about whether we should
speak could be invested into other life-enriching pursuits. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States echoed
these concerns, determining that “pervasive, persistent surveillance
even of noncontent communications information such as location

close friends and family—yet it may be precisely because we retain privacy from those
friends and family that we divulge these things to potential suitors.
44
See id. at 39 (“Privacy is a social ritual by means of which an individual’s moral title
to his existence is conferred. Privacy is an essential part of the complex social practice by
means of which the social group recognizes—and communicates to the individual—that
his existence is his own . . . . [P]rivacy is necessary to the creation of selves out of human
beings, since a self is[,] at least in part[,] a human being who regards his existence—his
thoughts, his body, his actions—as his own.”).
45
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 22, at 196.
46
See Jeffrey Rosen, What Would Privacy Expert Louis Brandeis Make of the Digital
Age?, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/clashbetween-free-speech-and-privacy-in-the-digital-world/2015/03/20/bee390e6-c0f8-11e4ad5c-3b8ce89f1b89_story.html [https://perma.cc/QZ6L-NZNC].
47
Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008).
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information can chill ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.’”48
Carpenter reanimated the spirit of an unsuspecting guest: Louis
Brandeis. The Court’s concern against government surveillance
harkened back to Brandeis’s famed dissent in Olmstead.49 There, he
wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness.
They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions
of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred,
as against the government, the right to be let alone—
the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.50
Although Carpenter and Olmstead concerned privacy’s relationship
to the Fourth Amendment, their discussions of privacy hold salience
for contemporary debates over the First Amendment, as well.
Indeed, Brandeis’s earlier preoccupation with privacy from the
press presents a quandary for which he became equally reputed in
defending freedom of speech.51 Scholars credit Brandeis’s concurrence in Whitney v. California52 with forming modern First Amendment theory.53 As he wrote, “[i]f there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
48

Margot E. Kaminski & Scott Skinner-Thompson, Free Speech Isn’t a Free Pass for
Privacy Violations, SLATE (Mar. 9, 2020, 2:53 PM), https://slate.com/technology/
2020/03/free-speech-privacy-clearview-ai-maine-isps.html [https://perma.cc/854S-7D5T]
(quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018)).
49
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50
Id. at 478.
51
See generally Richards, supra note 25.
52
274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
53
See, e.g., NEIL M. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 60 (2015); ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 85 (2015); Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of
Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV.
653, 668 (1988).
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process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence.”54 For Brandeis, speech begets speech; it contributes to the marketplace of ideas where the possibility for truth can
emerge. In view of his opinions in Olmstead and Whitney, it becomes clear that, for as much as Brandeis may have pinpointed the
tension between privacy and the First Amendment, he could not
have foreseen the conflict to define speech today, let alone its overlap with attendant privacy concerns.
As he noted in Olmstead, “in the application of a Constitution,
our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may
be.”55 By employing normative conventions around privacy,
Brandeis gestured future decisions to consider the implications of
permitting the law to enable certain privacy intrusions. He appealed
to judicial foresight that begs inquiry into the nature of surveillance
mechanisms and their coinciding privacy harms. However, while the
law lags behind emerging norms, it simultaneously maintains or circumscribes others.56 In this way, surveillance technology pursues
the institutionalization of its norms through judicial action, giving
legitimacy to its privacy intrusions. From this, we can understand
courts’ analyses of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” as a concession to surveillance technologies’ dominion over ourselves.
Their more pernicious effects will take hold by tethering norms to
antiquated case law, construing new privacy intrusions into old constitutional mandates.57 While companies abuse the law to their benefit, users’ claims to their own personhood remain at stake.
II. THE LIMITS TO EXISTING PRIVACY ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The United States relies on two primary privacy enforcement
mechanisms. At the state level, state attorneys general occupy the
confines of their particular jurisdictions and bring suits on behalf of
aggrieved parties. At the federal level, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) polices companies’ anticompetitive practices and
54

Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
56
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2022 (1996).
57
For a more thorough discussion of this trend, see infra Part IV.
55
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ensures they fulfill their promises, typically enumerated in privacy
policies. Neither entity addresses individual consumers’ grievances,
only their privacy incursions at large. With little means for individual redress, consumers are often disempowered from substantive
changes in privacy law. This Part provides a brief overview of these
concerns and pivots to the need for self-help mechanisms through
private rights of action.
A. State Attorneys General
Dubbed the “people’s privacy lawyers,”58 state attorneys general
(“AGs”) investigate and litigate data security concerns relating to
existing state and federal regulations.59 Although state AGs are empowered to enforce state and federal privacy laws, they are limited
to the laws—or safeguards—of their jurisdiction. In the earlier days,
as Joel Reidenberg claimed, public enforcement looked to “data security as a proxy for wrongful disclosures of personal information.”60 In other words, rather than targeting a wrongful disclosure itself, state AGs only addressed the violation of companies’
promises “to treat personal information with adequate security
measures.”61 Their reliance on “creative, tertiary theories for privacy
claims”—often the theory of “unfair trade practice”—failed to address underlying public wrongs, such as profiling and stereotyping
individuals on the basis of such data and data breaches.62
Because of their narrow jurisdiction, though, state AGs enjoy
more particular insights about local conditions than their federal
counterparts.63 Danielle Citron’s account exalts states’ specializations in discrete privacy realms.64 Despite her allusion to Illinois’s
specialty in identity theft and data security, she made no explicit
58

Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 752 (2016).
59
See id. at 761.
60
Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 877,
886 (2003).
61
Id. at 887.
62
Id. Using the New York AG as an example, Reidenberg noted an instance where the
Attorney General attacked a student marketing company’s data gathering practice rather
than addressing that the company trafficked children’s data. Id.
63
See Citron, supra note 58, at 786.
64
See id. at 786–90 (discussing individual states’ sectorial expertise).
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mention of any state’s biometric privacy protections.65 Rather than
warrant their own expertise, biometrics fall within existing categories of data privacy and protection. Texas and Washington, for example, authorize their state AGs to enforce biometric privacy laws
similar to how states enforce general data privacy rules.66
State AGs make for zealous consumer advocates, but they experience significant limitations to their effectiveness. For one, states
have to share the burdens of litigation out of a dearth of resources.67
With burden-sharing comes the risk of budget cuts or potential limits
to their enforcement powers.68 Industry lobbying efforts will not
only pursue limiting state AGs substantive powers, but also their
procedural powers through federal law preemption.69 And, as federal lawmakers pursue slashing the FTC’s budget, they complete a
vicious cycle that may overwhelm already under-resourced offices.70
B. Federal Trade Commission
The FTC enforces federal data privacy legislation and develops
policies that protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices
while preserving competition and legitimate business activity.71 Established in 1914, the FTC began as a trust-busting agency to police
anticompetitive practices.72 In 1938, Congress passed a sweeping
prohibition against “unfair and deceptive practices,” turning the
FTC into the largest proprietor for consumer protection.73

65

See id. at 788.
Hartzog, supra note 16, at 97.
67
Citron, supra note 58, at 796–97.
68
Id. at 797 (noting industry lobbying efforts to limit state attorneys general privacy and
data security enforcement powers).
69
See id. at 798.
70
See id. at 800; see also Alex Kantrowitz, Internal FTC Memo Announces Major Cuts
Ahead of Tech Giant Action, ONEZERO (Nov. 19, 2020), https://onezero.medium.com/
internal-ftc-memo-announces-major-cuts-ahead-of-tech-giant-action-8edb84fa5c69
[https://perma.cc/R5UV-SX7J].
71
About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc
[https://perma.cc/3FST-SEX5].
72
Id.
73
Id.
66
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As commerce quickly turned to the internet in the 1990s, the
FTC “expanded its focus on privacy to reflect the growing collection, use, and sharing of consumer data in the commercial marketplace.”74 Today, the FTC brings enforcement actions to “stop law
violations and require companies to take steps to remediate the unlawful behavior,” which mostly focus on protecting U.S. consumers,
though they may also extend protection to foreign consumers, as
well.75 Specifically, Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “deceptive
or unfair commercial practices.”76 A representation, omission, or
practice is deceptive “if it is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances and is material to consumers.”77 A
practice is unfair if (1) it “causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury”; (2) the injury is “not reasonably avoidable by consumers”;
and (3) the injury is “not outweighed by benefits to consumers or
competition.”78
Apart from the FTC Act, the agency enforces other privacy laws,
including protecting consumers’ financial information, ability to opt
out of commercial e-mail messages, and children’s online privacy.79
However, the FTC continues to experience significant limitations on
its enforcement powers. For example, Section 5 does not allow the
FTC to seek civil penalties for first-time offenses, which risks disabling the agency’s enforcement ability in the event of an adverse
74

FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC’S USE OF ITS AUTHORITIES TO PROTECT CONSUMER
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 1 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/
reports-response-senate-appropriations-committee-report-116-111-ftcs-use-itsauthorities-resources/p065404reportprivacydatasecurity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RM9URDQE] [hereinafter FTC 2020 REPORT].
75
Id. at app. at 1. Notably, on July 24, 2019, the FTC and U.S. Department of Justice
settled a claim against Facebook, alleging that the social media platform mispresented the
extent of control users had over their personal information and failed to adequately
safeguard such information. FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy
Restrictions
on
Facebook,
FED. TRADE COMM’N
(July
24,
2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billionpenalty-sweeping-new-privacy-restrictions-facebook
[https://perma.cc/U9ND-36T2].
They also alleged that Facebook used users’ phone numbers for targeted advertisements.
Id. The case settled for $5 billion, becoming the largest penalty ever imposed on any
company for violating consumers’ privacy. Id.
76
FTC 2020 REPORT, supra note 74, at 1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681).
77
Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
78
15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
79
FTC 2020 REPORT, supra note 74, at 5 (citations omitted).
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determination.80 Section 5 also excludes non-profits and common
carriers from the agency’s authority, even when these entities’ acts
implicate serious privacy concerns.81 Finally, the agency lacks rulemaking authority under the Administrative Procedure Act, stifling
the agency’s ability to make rules quickly.82 As a result, the agency
fills in its “regulatory gaps” with consent decrees, which provide a
number of compliance requirements to specific companies.83 These
consent decrees have come to constitute a common law of privacy
jurisprudence around unfair and deceptive practices.84
In assessing unfair and deceptive practices, the FTC adheres to
the now-dominant legal regime for data privacy in the United States:
notice-and-consent.85 This regime requires websites and platforms
notify users of their data practices—usually through their privacy
policies—and that users agree to those terms to use their services.86
Accordingly, the FTC looks to whether a company broke its promise
to consumers rather than whether the company’s data practice itself
was either unfair or deceptive.87
By giving primacy to privacy policies, the agency recapitulates
two critical issues in consumer data privacy. First, users seldom read
privacy policies, let alone understand them.88 In a study conducted
by Carnegie Mellon University, researchers approximated that it
would take an average person seventy-six full working days per year
80

Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
82
Id. at 7.
83
JULIE COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 188 (2019).
84
See generally Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014).
85
See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES
IN THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplacefederal-trade-commission-report/privacy2000text.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6XFM-AV39]
[hereinafter FTC FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES REPORT].
86
Id.
87
See Ari Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 129, 141–42
(2018) (discussing how the FTC’s broken promises litigation is based on the “substantive
disclosures” in a privacy policy).
88
Cf. Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39, 87 (2015) (concluding
that privacy policies are ambiguous on key terms).
81
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to read every privacy policy applicable to them.89 In another survey,
the Pew Research Center found that over half of internet users believe—incorrectly— that privacy policies ensure data confidentiality.90 Because most users neither read nor understand privacy policies, their consent is often ill-informed.91 It also risks undermining
the FTC’s requirement for websites to provide consumers with clear
and conspicuous notice of their information practices.92
Second, and relatedly, the FTC defers to company’s policy
terms, which bear little input from key stakeholders, namely consumers. Consumers are often unable to exercise meaningful choice
over websites’ data practices, turning privacy policies into adhesion
contracts.93 However, the bulk of legal theories underlying contract
law disfavor consumer protections. In the few instances where consumers alleged privacy harms spawning from privacy policies, their
contract claims failed for lacking detrimental reliance, especially in
light of their failure to read the policies themselves.94 Because FTC
enforcement actions only target these policies’ terms, the agency reinforces power asymmetries between companies and consumers. Its
status as our de facto privacy regulator is, at best, incomplete.95

89

See Alexis C. Madrigal, Reading the Privacy Policies You Encounter in a Year Would
Take 76 Work Days, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2012/03/reading-the-privacy-policies-you-encounter-in-a-year-would-take-76work-days/253851 [https://perma.cc/9YST-59LH]; see also Aleecia McDonald & Lorrie
Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S J. OF L. & POL’Y 540 (2008).
90
Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy Is, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/04/half-ofamericans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/ [https://perma.cc/EA6J-VBWD].
91
Daniel Susser, Notice After Notice-and-Consent: Why Privacy Disclosures Are
Valuable Even If Consent Frameworkers Aren’t, 9 J. INFO. POL’Y 148, 155–56 (2019).
92
See FTC FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES REPORT, supra note 85, at iii; see also
Reidenberg et al., supra note 88, at 40 (“[A]mbiguous wording in typical privacy policies
undermines the ability of privacy policies to effectively convey notice of data practices to
the general public.”).
93
See Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Lessons
Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 14 (2009).
94
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 84, at 596.
95
See CHRIS J. HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PRIVACY LAW 119–23
(2016); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 84, at 599–600; Steven Hetcher, The De Facto
Federal Privacy Commission, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO. L. 109, 131 (2000).
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C. Inadequacies for Protecting Consumers
State AGs and the FTC can only offer limited protections for
consumer data privacy.96 Their efforts largely operate within existing legal infrastructures captured by corporate interests in self-regulation. Where enforcement prevails, it falls short of providing individual victims with any real remedies.97 As Woodrow Hartzog
noted, building biometric privacy frameworks around concepts of
transparency and informational self-determination feign the impression that consumers harness autonomy in their online interactions.98
However, when platforms limit choice availability—or, worse, obscure choices that are otherwise available99—neither AGs nor the
FTC can signal particular harms.100 Our existing notice-and-consent
regime turns informed consent into a platitude, allocating risk management to consumers whose choices are ill-defined and illusive.101
Incumbent pressures to assimilate into contemporary social life
96

See Ari Waldman, Privacy Law’s False Promise, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 773, 783–84
(2020) (“FTC commissioners and state AGs share one essential quality: they are charged
with public governance and social welfare functions. But, in reality, many legal policy
decisions are made by social groups far from those charged to protect citizens. Online
platforms employ armies of content moderators to negotiate internal speech rules and make
fair use determinations in copyright law. We outsource constitutional responsibilities to
police officers, who make practical interpretations of search and seizure law in the moment.
Catherine Crump argues that surveillance policy is made by vendors hired by the
government. We are increasingly outsourcing judicial decision-making to mediators and
arbitrators who hear evidence, consider legal arguments, and issue binding orders. And
CPOs, lawyers, and compliance personnel create an internal ‘company law’ of privacy.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Richards & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 1499 (“The
FTC has made a heroic effort to be the top U.S. privacy cop, but it has been starved of the
legal tools and financial resources it needs to do a proper job.”).
97
Reidenberg, supra note 60, at 878.
98
Hartzog, supra note 16, at 102.
99
For discussions of user interface designs that deceive users into making unintended,
harmful choices, see Arunesh Mathur et al., Dark Patterns at Scale: Findings from a Crawl
of 11K Shopping Websites, 3 PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION, Nov. 2019, art. no.
81; see also Ari Waldman, Cognitive Biases, Dark Patterns, and the ‘Privacy Paradox,’
31 CURRENT OP. PSYCHOLOGY 105 (2020).
100 Hartzog, supra note 16, at 102 (“[B]y focusing on giving people control over their
data and mandating procedural disclosure obligations, these frameworks fail to impose
substantive limits on how far companies can encroach into our lives and how deeply these
systems can be entrenched. Procedural transparency and consent regimes end up serving
as a justification mechanism for all kinds of encroachments without any clear backstop to
how vulnerable we can be made to these systems, so long as we consent.”).
101 Id. at 103.
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online make regrettable choices inescapable and meaningful choices
nearly impossible.102
We can situate the FTC’s deference to privacy policies’ terms
within a larger legal infrastructure beholden to the wrong kinds of
private interests. Principally concerned with stifled innovation and
anticompetitive activity, the FTC maintains its legitimacy to the extent that it merely enforces companies’ promises.103 But privacy policies represent an “uncontract” that signifies a unilateral—and unequivocal—right to dispense users’ information at will.104 Importantly, whereas Shoshana Zuboff considered these phenomena
beyond the scope of law,105 legal scholars have argued that these
agreements represent acts of legal entrepreneurship.106 They rely on
an oeuvre of antiquated corporate-protective norms that privilege
unilateral contracts whose terms shy from consumers’ entitlements
to privacy and license extensive data appropriation.107

102

Richards & Hartzog, supra note 11, at 1463 (likening the notice-and-consent regime
to a “take-it-or-leave-it” approach).
103
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 84, at 604.
104 See S
HOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 220–21 (2019) (“The
uncontract is not a space of contractual relations but rather a unilateral execution that makes
those relations unnecessary. The uncontract desocializes the contract, manufacturing
certainty through the substitution of automated procedures for promises, dialogue, shared
meaning, problem solving, dispute resolution, and trust: the expressions of solidarity and
human agency that have been gradually institutionalized in the notion of ‘contract’ over
the course of millennia. The uncontract bypasses all that social work in favor of
compulsion, and it does so for the sake of more-lucrative prediction products that
approximate observation and therefore guarantee outcomes.”).
105 Shoshana Zuboff on the Age of Surveillance Capitalism, C
ONTAGIOUS (Sept. 16,
2019),
https://www.contagious.com/news-and-views/shoshana-zuboff-on-the-age-ofsurveillance-capitalism [https://perma.cc/HEX8-LYPX] (“Law trails behind the market
because the market moves into lawless space. That’s the whole idea of: ‘We took nature
because there were no laws to protect nature because no one thought it could be taken.’
There were no laws to protect private human experience because no one thought it could
be taken.”).
106 See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Review of Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 17
SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 240, 241 (2019); Amy Kapczynski, The Law of Informational
Capitalism, 129 YALE L.J. 1460, 1465 (2020).
107
See Cohen, supra note 106 (“Terms-of-use agreements are performative acts of
consummation. Together with the technical protocols that structure interactions with
platforms and other information services, they work to leverage ad hoc and contingent trade
secrecy entitlements into de facto property arrangements.”).
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By turning our data into raw material for profit extraction, private companies engage in market analytics that form the logical extension of commodity fetishism.108 They also embroil themselves in
battles to maximally exploit the value in our personal data, all the
while exposing us to extensive vulnerabilities.109 Using predictive
algorithms, these data analyses provide more than passive determinations; they provoke certain responses that divorce us from contexts that otherwise elicit human decisional conflicts in the first
place. Put differently, recent analytics efforts pitch us contexts that
ensure specific behavioral responses.
Inadequate legal infrastructures are part and parcel of the
broader political economy that enables corporate actors to operate
under the law.110 As Ari Waldman argues, privacy law reaches its
apex when judges, lawyers, and scholars defer to symbolic structures—appointing compliance officers, conducting data risk assessments and impact evaluations, and automating data breach notifications—as evidence of adherence to the law.111 All the law does, then,
is transfer regulatory monitoring to companies themselves, wedding
a form of collaborative governance that shifts compliance enforcement out of regulators’ hands. Symbolic compliance becomes compliance for its own sake; it permits regulators to avert their attention
from companies’ more deleterious practices. Without this trustworthy allegiance, consumers are forced to engage in legal self-help
through private rights of action.

108

ZUBOFF, supra note 104, at 8 (“Surveillance capitalism unilaterally claims human
experience as free raw material for translation into behavioural data . . . [which] are
declared as a proprietary behavioural surplus, fed into advanced manufacturing processes
known as ‘machine intelligence’, and fabricated into prediction products that anticipate
what you will do now, soon, and later.”).
109
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
110 See Kapczynski, supra note 106, at 1515 (“Our legal order, intertwined with the
architecture of digital networks, has enabled the creation of vast new firms that wield new
forms of surveillance and algorithmic power, but it also has delivered us a form of
neoliberal capitalism that is inclined toward monopoly, concentrated power, and
inequality. Most troubling are the developments in takings law, free speech law, and free
trade law that are working to insulate growing private economic and surveillance power
from democratic control.”).
111 See Waldman, supra note 96, at 815.
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III. BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT: A HISTORY
Currently, there are no federal safeguards for biometric data.112
In the absence of such protections, states are left to their own devices
to determine adequate precautions and enforcement mechanisms for
protecting such data, turning them into laboratories for “novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”113
As a result, the United States hosts a hodgepodge of inconsistent
legal infrastructures, forcing government agencies and private entities to resort to self-regulation.114 To put it into perspective, it is currently legal in forty-five states to use software to identify an individual using images taken without consent while the individual is in
public.115 The remaining five states—New York, California, Washington, Illinois, and Texas—ban using this software for commercial
purposes.116
In 2008, Illinois became the first jurisdiction to offer comprehensive protection for biometric data. With its passage, BIPA117 became the archetype for biometric privacy law.118 BIPA regulates private actors’ collection of biometric identifiers and information.119
Under BIPA, a “biometric identifier” refers to a retina or iris scan,

112

See Carra Pope, Note, Biometric Data Collection in an Unprotected World: Exploring
the Need for Federal Legislation Protecting Biometric Data, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 769, 770
(2018); see also Matt Laslo, Hey Congress, How’s That Privacy Bill Coming Along?,
WIRED (Nov. 29, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/congress-privacy-billcopra/ [https://perma.cc/2C5P-K64F] (describing the Senate-proposed Consumer Online
Privacy Rights Act).
113
Susan Crawford, Facial Recognition Laws Are (Literally) All Over the Map, WIRED
(Dec. 16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facial-recognition-laws-areliterally-all-over-the-map/ [https://perma.cc/SEW6-DBSX] (quoting New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
114
Biometric Data and Privacy Laws (GDPR, CCPA/CPRA), THALES, https://
www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/biometrics/
biometric-data [https://perma.cc/GY29-LJSS] (June 16, 2021).
115 Id.
116 Id.
117
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1 (2008).
118 Jane Bambauer, Biometric Privacy Laws: How a Little-Known Illinois Law Made
Facebook Illegal, ANTONIN SCALIA L. SCH. PROGRAM ON ECON. & PRIV.,
https://pep.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2017/06/Biometric-Privacy-LawsFINAL_really_6.20-.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UAL-XCG8].
119 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(g).
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fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of one’s hand or face geometry.120
Before collecting biometric information, private entities must inform individuals in writing that their biometric information is being
collected, and disclose the purpose and length of time for which such
information is being obtained.121 Companies must also receive written consent from consumers, authorizing the private entity to collect
that data for any specified purposes.122 Finally, BIPA prohibits the
profiteering of biometric information123 and mandates guidelines for
destroying the information once its original purpose for collection
expires.124
BIPA protects individuals from the “surreptitious and nonconsensual capture of their biometric identifiers, including faceprints.”125 In doing so, the legislature identified the especially precarious nature of biometric data.126 As written in the statute:
Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are
used to access finances or other sensitive information. For example, social security numbers, when
compromised, can be changed. Biometrics, however,
are biologically unique to the individual; therefore,
once compromised, the individual has no recourse
[and] is at heightened risk for identity theft . . . .127
Senator Al Franken reiterated these concerns during the hearing of
the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the
Law, where he discussed the implications of facial recognition technologies for privacy and civil liberties.128 Specifically, he stated:

120

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(b).
122
Id.
123 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(c).
124
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15(a).
125 Elizabeth Montalbano, ACLU Sues Clearview AI Over Faceprint Collection, Sale,
THREATPOST (May 29, 2020, 8:40 AM), https://threatpost.com/aclu-sues-clearview-aiover-faceprint-collection-sale/156117/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2022) (quoting ACLU
complaint against Clearview AI).
126
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(c).
127 Id.
128
What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Priv., Tech. and the Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th
121
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biometric information is already among the most
sensitive of our private information, mainly because
it is both unique and permanent. You can change
your password. You can get a new credit card. But
you cannot change your fingerprint, and you cannot
change your face—unless, I guess, you go to a great
deal of trouble.129
Unlike other forms of private data, biometrics are inherent to
personhood.130 They are, in short, our most immediate interface with
the world. “Your face,” as Senator Franken notes, “is a conduit to
an incredible amount of information about you, and facial recognition technology can allow others to access all of that information
from a distance, without your knowledge, and in about as much time
as it takes to snap a photo.”131 That our faces may be subject to theft
is no small tribulation. Nor does it amount to undue hysteria.132 In
2019, the biggest known biometric data breach to date compromised
a twenty-three gigabyte database containing nearly thirty-million
records, including fingerprint and facial biometric data.133 The
Cong. 1 (2012) (opening statement of Senator Al Franken) [hereinafter Hearing on FRT
and Privacy].
129
Id. Although Senator Franken does not explicitly name it, the relationship between
facial recognition technology and facial reconstructive surgery has yielded considerable
scholarship in recent years. For a more thorough discussion, see generally Kevin J. Zuo et
al., Facial Recognition Technology: A Primer for Plastic Surgeons, 143 PLASTIC &
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 1298 (2019).
130 See Hearing on FRT and Privacy, supra note 128, at 1.
131
Id.
132
For a recent history of data breaches, see Rob Sobers, 98 Must-Know Data Breach
Statistics for 2022, VARONIS, https://www.varonis.com/blog/data-breach-statistics/
[https://perma.cc/GXB7-3GYD] (Apr. 16, 2021).
133 Chaminda Hewage, Stolen Fingerprints Could Spell the End of Biometric Security,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 20, 2019, 8:06 AM), https://theconversation.com/stolenfingerprints-could-spell-the-end-of-biometric-security-heres-how-to-save-it-122001
[https://perma.cc/23AG-SNH2]. In their annual report on data breach trends, Experian
correctly predicted that “attackers will zero in on biometric hacking,” referring to the recent
breach of Suprema’s biometric identification system used by “5,700 organizations in
[eighty-three] countries, including governments, banks, and the police.” EXPERIAN, DATA
BREACH INDUSTRY FORECAST 2020, at 8 (2020), https://www.experian.com/content/dam/
marketing/na/assets/data-breach/white-papers/Experian-Data-Breach-Industry-Forecast2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4NV-AXYG] [hereinafter 2020 DATA BREACH FORECAST];
Zak Doffman, New Data Breach Has Exposed Millions of Fingerprint and Facial
Recognition Records: Report, FORBES (Aug. 15, 2019, 4:31 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
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company left more than one-million people’s biometric information
unprotected on a publicly accessible database.134 That same year, the
Department of Homeland Security experienced not one, but two data
breaches,135 one of which resulted in 184,000 travelers’ images from
a facial recognition pilot pouring into the dark web.136 The latent
threat of a biometric data breach risks depriving us of more than
financial or reputational well-being. In a holistic sense, it carries the
possibility for individuals to operate in the world as someone other
than themselves.137
Although BIPA lay dormant for its first few years, it became a
prominent site for class action litigation since 2015, featuring suits
against social media platforms alleging “improper collection of facial geometries in photographs without notice and consent.”138 The

sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/14/new-data-breach-has-exposed-millions-of-fingerprint-andfacial-recognition-records-report/#551b9bbf46c6 (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
134 See 2020 DATA BREACH FORECAST, supra note 133, at 8.
135 Chris Burt, Breached CBP Contractor May Have Been Training Biometric Facial
Recognition Algorithm, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (June 11, 2019, 1:25 PM),
https://www.biometricupdate.com/201906/breached-cbp-contractor-may-have-beentraining-biometric-facial-recognition-algorithm [https://perma.cc/KQP7-EB4J].
136
Chris Burt, CBP Biometric Pilot Data Breached from Perceptics Winds Up on Dark
Web, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Sept. 25, 2020, 5:23 PM), https://www.biometricupdate.com/
202009/cbp-biometric-pilot-data-breached-from-perceptics-winds-up-on-dark-web
[https://perma.cc/58TD-E5CU].
137
Hearing on FRT and Privacy, supra note 128, at 1–2 (“But facial recognition creates
acute privacy concerns that fingerprints do not. Once someone has your fingerprint, they
can dust your house or your surroundings to figure out what you have touched. Once
someone has your faceprint, they can get your name, they can find your social networking
account, and they can find and track you in the street, in the stores that you visit, the
Government buildings you enter, and the photos your friends post online.”).
138 Steven Grimes & Eric Shinabarger, Biometric Privacy Litigation: The Next Class
Action Battleground, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 9, 2018, 4:38 PM), https://
news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/biometric-privacy-litigation-the-nextclass-action-battleground/ [https://perma.cc/6AQU-SYYE] (citing Norberg v. Shutterfly,
Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, (N.D. Ill. 2015)). Given its pervasive use of facial recognition
technologies, Facebook remains a popular target for BIPA litigation, accruing several
lawsuits over the last five years. See Christopher Zara, Facebook Keeps Getting Sued Over
Face-Recognition Software, and Privacy Groups Say We Should Be Paying More
Attention, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015, 3:49 PM), https://www.ibtimes.com/facebookkeeps-getting-sued-over-face-recognition-software-privacy-groups-say-we-2082166 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2022); Jay Peters, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle Privacy Lawsuit
Over Facial Recognition Tech, VERGE (Jan. 29, 2020, 7:17 PM),
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now-notorious piece of legislation provides a private right of action
against alleged violators.139 In 2019, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that plaintiffs only need to demonstrate a violation of their
statutory rights, rather than an actual injury, to proceed in court.140
The court recognized that “[t]o require individuals to wait until they
have sustained some compensable injury beyond violation of their
statutory rights before they may seek recourse . . . would be completely antithetical to the Act’s preventative and deterrent purposes.”141
A. Clearview AI and Biometric Data Collection
Facial recognition technology remains a principal target for
BIPA litigation. In January 2020, Kashmir Hill revealed the technology’s latest iteration in a now-notorious company, Clearview
AI.142 Operating out of a WeWork space, the New York-based
startup drew acclaim for its refined facial recognition capacities,
boasting investments from Peter Thiel, the famed venture capitalist
behind PayPal, Palantir, and Facebook.143 Before marketing to law
enforcement agencies, its CEO, Hoan Ton-That, liaised with former
Congressional candidate Paul Nehlen144 for an “unconventional database” to conduct “extreme opposition research.”145 Now, Clearview contracts with over six-hundred law enforcement agencies.146
Although the company claims—and its website represents—that
https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/29/21114358/facebook-550-million-settle-lawsuitfacial-recognition-technology-illinois (last visited Apr. 19, 2022).
139
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20.
140
See Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019); see also
Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1274 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that the collection
and use of biometric data provided a concrete injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III
standing). But see Matthew Boesler, Google Wins Dismissal of Suit Over Facial
Recognition Software, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-29/google-wins-dismissal-of-suit-overfacial-recognition-software-jq9w1mws
[https://perma.cc/ZG52-8QKG]
(discussing
plaintiffs’ lack of concrete injuries violating their statutory rights under BIPA).
141 See Rosenbach, 129 N.E.3d at 1207.
142
Hill, supra note 6.
143 Id.
144
Extremist Files: Paul Nehlen, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/
fighting-hate/extremist-files/individual/paul-nehlen [https://perma.cc/66QV-N92Z].
145
Hill, supra note 6.
146 Id.
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their software is only for law enforcement use, a data breach in February 2020 unveiled its client list, including private retailers like
Walmart, Kohl’s, Best Buy, and Macy’s.147 Subsequent investigation demonstrated that private persons acting in their individual capacities also had their hands on the software.148 In addition to conventional retail surveillance and employee intimidation, these persons used Clearview for illicit purposes, such as identifying their
children’s dates “within seconds.”149
While facial recognition technology is not new, its improvements have been unprecedented. As Hill noted, police departments
have employed these technologies for over twenty years, though
they were powered by full-frontal, government-provided images,
such as mug shots and driver’s license photos.150 What differentiates
Clearview, though, is its breadth of available images and its algorithm’s sophistication. Through a practice called “data scraping,” or
automated data harvesting, the company indexes a database of “publicly available” images from social media platforms, as well as employment, news, and educational sites.151
Clearview generates a searchable database of over three-billion
images, sourcing biometric data from publicly available platforms
like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, and Venmo.152 After
users upload an image, Clearview’s algorithm relates the person’s
facial features to other images depicting the same individual.153 Like
other facial recognition technologies, its software reduces a person’s
facial anatomy to its component parts, extracting biometric information from the images to comprehend and determine a person’s

147

Ryan Mac et al., Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has Been Used by the Justice
Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED NEWS, https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/WF7B-Q5F5] (Feb. 27, 2020, 3:43 PM).
148
Kashmir Hill, Before Clearview Became a Police Tool, It Was a Secret Plaything of
the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/05/technology/clearviewinvestors.html [https://perma.cc/3C3P-L58D] (Mar. 6, 2020).
149
Id.
150 Hill, supra note 6.
151
Id.; see also generally Benjamin Sobel, A New Common Law of Web Scraping, 25
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 147 (2021).
152
Hill, supra note 6.
153 Id.
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identity.154 As Ton-That explained, Clearview’s facial recognition
algorithm:
convert[s] all the images into mathematical formulas,
or vectors, based on facial geometry—like how far
apart a person’s eyes are. Clearview created a vast
directory that clustered all the photos with similar
vectors into “neighborhoods.” When a user uploads
a photo of a face into Clearview’s system, it converts
the face into a vector and then shows all the scraped
photos stored in that vector’s neighborhood—along
with the links to the sites from which those images
came.155
Using vector analysis, the algorithm takes an image and understands it in terms of its quantitative metrics, particularly the face’s
measurements.156 It does not necessarily understand it as a face, but

154

Facial recognition technologies employ deep neural network learning mechanisms
that enable greater accuracy in identification. In short, neural networks build from
abstractions to particularities and, with enough data, they will be able to learn more about
the specific divergencies in a training data set. Typical modern image processing nets are
structured with low-level neurons being fed the direct pixels of an image, which then feeds
their output. For example, this may involve relaying something like edges that were
detected or colors that were found in the image to the next levels of neurons, which might
be responsible for detecting shapes and patterns, and passing those outputs on to the next
layers. Each layer builds up a more nuanced understanding of the image using the
understanding of the previous layer’s output. Training a network involves passing millions
of images through it over the course of thousands of iterations, essentially rewarding the
network when it is able to make any inferences about individuals in the dataset. So the low
levels—the colors and textures, for instance—learn these abstract patterns first, and
eventually, over time, the higher level neurons will no longer need to worry about the
abstractions that have already been learned: they see one level of neurons telling them that
this is a “brown image,” another that says it is a “face,” and another that gives it a shape,
and the networks join these determinations to conclude that the image represents a
particular person. For more information about facial recognition technologies and deep
neural network learning, see Davide Castelvecchi, Is Facial Recognition Too Biased to be
Let Loose?, NATURE (Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-02003186-4 [https://perma.cc/7BHL-GPV6].
155 Hill, supra note 6.
156
Joint Investigation of Clearview AI, Inc. by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, Commission d’accès à l’information du Québec, the Information and Privacy
Commissioner for British Columbia, and the Information Privacy Comissioner of Alberta,
OFF. OF PRIV. COMM’R OF CAN. (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-
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the measurements enable it to then recognize a pattern between images.157 That pattern then apprehends a face, reproducing it as an
amalgam of quantitative metrics.158 The face is no longer more than
the sum of its parts; it is a coordinate plane that renders signs and
significations.159
These vector analyses may trouble normative and legal frameworks for data collection. Here, Ton-That draws an analogy to
Google, which “downloads the whole Internet and then makes an
index of all common keywords that point to the original page.”160
On a technical level, Ton-That would still need to store the vector
data—the “keywords”—in order to search it. But he could process
that data without ever storing the original image. Rather, he could
store the metadata—the multitude of vectors—to conceive the image and produce a “composite [of the image].”161
Clearview’s basic line is simple: components inherent to a public image are necessarily public, as well. After all, Clearview only
extrapolates information from the public image. But, because Clearview does not return the image, its functionality bears distinguishment. Suppose you take an image of yourself next to a standard
doorframe. By relating your depiction in the image to the standard
doorframe, you can approximate your height. But doing so requires
outside knowledge inputs; you would need to know the height of a
standard doorframe. Assuming the photo lacks any other obscurities,
you ascertain your height by analyzing the image’s measurements,
calculating the proportions of the measured image’s heights,

decisions/investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2021/pipeda-2021-001/
[https://perma.cc/74NQ-9FK5].
157
Id.
158 Id.
159
GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND PLATEAUS 115 (Brian Massumi
trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 2d ed. 1987) (1980) (“[T]he face crystallizes all redundancies,
it emits and receives, releases and recaptures signifying signs. . . .The face is what gives
the signifier substance; it is what fuels interpretation, and it is what changes, changes traits,
when interpretation reimparts [the] signifier to its substance.”).
160
This Week in Startups, E1100: Clearview AI CEO Hoan Ton-That on Balancing
Privacy & Security, Engaging with Controversy, YOUTUBE (Aug. 25, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wNLK_f6m4e0 [https://perma.cc/8GE4-HULH].
161 Id.
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combining outside information about the doorframe’s height, and
arriving at your own height.
However, algorithms cannot access this outside information on
their own. No less than a person viewing the image, the doorframe’s
standard height is not readily apparent. Without that information, an
algorithm can reconstruct the door and person in the image respectively, but cannot reconstruct an analysis that relates the person to
the door. At best, algorithms give an approximate understanding of
each represented object—the door and person—because the image
reproduces you but is not actually you. And, whereas there are standard doorframes, such that you could input outside knowledge into
the algorithm to reach more accurate results, faces are not standard;
thus, the algorithm lacks a point of comparison other than the subject
itself.
Ton-Thot simultaneously boasts his software’s sophistication
while recognizing the reality that every face is unique.162 To take
this position seriously, though, means no technology could ever
identify every person with full precision unless it had data on every
existing person; again, these technologies produce, at best, working
approximations.163 While facial recognition technologies have
proven to identify people with greater accuracy than the human
eye—a sensational selling point for these kinds of technologies—
162

During their interview, Jason Calacanis asked Ton-Thot whether earlier developers
had a blind spot to differentiating among races and ethnicities, or whether, for example,
“all Irish people look the same?” Id. In response, Ton-Thot said, “[e]veryone’s face is
unique.” Id. For this reason, he insisted that no races are more “unique” than others. Id.
The problem, then, is that celebrity training data sets are not fully representative of the
whole population. Id. But, absent considerable data on every individual, no amount of
neural network processing will achieve full recognition capacities. Id.
163 For discussions about bias in facial recognition technologies, see Natasha Singer &
Cade Metz, Many Facial-Recognition Systems Are Biased, Says U.S. Study, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/technology/facial-recognitionbias.html [https://perma.cc/HZ93-56XG]; Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face
Recognition on Flawed Data, GEORGETOWN L. CTR. PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019),
https://www.flawedfacedata.com/ [https://perma.cc/Q4LW-TYLJ]; Steve Lohr, Facial
Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificialintelligence.html [https://perma.cc/EM6L-P936]; SARAH MYERS WEST ET AL.,
DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN AI (2019); Joy Buolamwini &
Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender
Classification, in 81 PROCEEDINGS OF MACHINE LEARNING RESEARCH 77 (2018).
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we should not expect otherwise. These facial recognition algorithms
demonstrate that faces are reducible to numerical representations
that are beyond the kind of comprehension the human eye performs.
More likely, people perform qualitative analyses when they “recognize” others in the world, which explains why we are subject to misrecognition.164 But just because computers perform quantitative
analyses—measuring facial geometries, for instance—does not
mean that they are less fallible. In fact, this is their limit: facial
recognition technologies aspire toward unattainable precision and
struggle to recognize meaningful differences.
Using these vector analyses for biometric data collection proves
unsettling, if only because it appropriates its subjects’ likenesses and
transposes them from their image. Their translation becomes less
about resemblance than relocation or displacement.165 As cultural
critic Homi Bhabha wrote:
What is within photography that reaches beyond its
limits in order to animate other desires . . . is its mode
of signification, not its mimetic resemblance as image. By re-situating or re-locating photography in yet
another representational or narrative medium . . . the
subject gains another life, and the photographic image survives as itself, in a different form.166
Clearview exploits this feature of photography which was once only
the province of thought: there is something in an image that is more

164

See FACE PROCESSING: ADVANCED MODELING AND METHODS 8–9 (Wenyi Zhao &
Rama Chellappa eds., 2006). But see Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand
Posts: Developing Face Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
165, 170 (2012) (“While recognition is a natural human skill, the human brain can only
memorize a limited number of faces. On the other hand, computers can process and
remember a vast number of facial features to recognize many more people. But
qualitatively, the human brain does a more complete job of recognizing faces than
computers because it is able to combine visual recognition with other human senses.”).
165 See W
ALTER BENJAMIN, The Translator’s Task, in ILLUMINATIONS 161 (Steven
Rendall trans., 1969) (“[I]nstead of making itself resemble the meaning of the original, [a
translation] must lovingly, and in detail, fashion in its own language a counterpart to the
original’s mode of intention, in order to make both of them as fragments of vessel, as
fragments of a greater language.”).
166
See generally Homi Bhabha, Beyond Photography, in A LIVING MAN DECLARED
DEAD AND OTHER CHAPTERS I-XVIII (2012).
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than the image. The company argues that features internal to a public
image are also public, including biometric data,167 reanimating a
central tension concerning whether individuals retain any privacy in
public.168
B. Clearview AI’s BIPA Litigation
Within four days of Hill’s investigative report release, Illinois
residents filed a class action against Clearview for violating their
biometric privacy.169 The company soon became ensnared in several
class action lawsuits.170 In Mutnick, the parties contended that Clearview circumvented various platforms’ terms of use agreements to
collect and obtain biometric data from users’ profiles.171 Its collection interfered with and violated users’ contracts with these platforms, to which they entrusted their data.172 Because they own their
data servers, Clearview receives real-time access to user activity on
their application, including ongoing criminal investigations.173 As
the Mutnick complaint alleged, “Clearview is enmeshed in the use
of state power against individual American citizens and, further, has
the unique opportunity to tip off and/or extort suspects.”174 In Hill’s
report, she mentioned that, after soliciting several police officers to
run on a search on her, the company quickly called the officers to
ask whether they were speaking to the media.175
Plaintiffs in both Burke v. Clearview AI and ACLU v. Clearview
AI raised similar concerns. In Burke, the parties offered a parade of

167

See Companies’ Cease-and-Desist Letters, supra note 18.
See generally Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIA. L. REV. 141 (2014);
Hartzog, supra note 4.
169
See Class Action Complaint, Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-cv-00512
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2020).
170
See, e.g., id.; Memorandum Decision and Order Denying the Motion to Intervene and
to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Stay Cases or Transfer Venue, Burke v. Clearview AI, Inc.,
No. 2020-cv-03104 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2020); Complaint, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc.,
No. 9337839 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28, 2020).
171 Class Action Complaint, supra note 169, at 19.
172
Id.
173 Id. at 2.
174
Id.
175 Hill, supra note 6.
168
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horribles.176 Among them, they posed scenarios where the application empowered a rogue employee to stalk potential romantic partners, a foreign government to discover information to blackmail key
individuals, or law enforcement agencies to pry into citizens’ private
lives without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.177 In ACLU,
the parties described that many private actors acquired the application free of charge for a thirty-day trial, relieving them of any contractual obligations with Clearview.178 By February 2020, “people
associated with 2,228 companies, law enforcement agencies, and
other institutions had collectively performed nearly 500,000
searches of Clearview’s faceprint database.”179
All of the complaints alleged the same violation of BIPA: Clearview collected and sold the parties’ biometric identifiers and information without users’ consent.180 Clearview also failed to provide a
retention schedule for the maintenance of users’ biometric data.181
Two recent cases may serve as harbingers for Clearview’s fate.
C. Privacy Harms, Tangible Harms
In Rivera v. Google, Google scanned images from its cloudbased service, Google Photos, to “locate[] [the plaintiff’s] face and
zero[] in on its unique contours to create a ‘template’ that maps and
records her distinct facial measurements.”182 Google argued that the
plaintiffs complaint about the use of their photographs fell outside
of BIPA’s scope for biometric identifiers.183 It drew a distinction
between photographic and in-person facial scans, contending that
only the latter qualify as biometric identifiers.184 However, the court

176

See Class Action Complaint at 3, Burke v. Clearview AI, Inc, No. 2020-cv-03104
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2020).
177
Id.
178 Complaint at 4, ACLU v. Clearview AI, No. 9337839 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28, 2020).
179
Id. (citing Mac et al., supra note 147).
180 Class Action Complaint at 11–12, Mutnick v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-cv-00512
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2020); Class Action Complaint at 18–19, Burke, No. 2020-cv-03104
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2020); Complaint at 31–32, ACLU, No. 9337839 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28,
2020).
181
See, e.g., Complaint at 12, Mutnick, No. 2020-cv-00512 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 22, 2020).
182 Rivera v. Google Inc. (Rivera I), 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1091 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
183
Id. at 1092.
184 Id. at 1095.
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did not take the bait.185 The court concluded, “if Google simply captured and stored the photographs and did not measure and generate
scans of face geometry, then there would be no violation of the
Act.”186 Its decision suggests that biometric data obtained from nonbiometric sources, such as photographs, may still be considered a
biometric identifier under BIPA.187
The following year, the Northern District of Illinois returned to
the Rivera case and ultimately granted summary judgment for
Google, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III
and failed to allege any concrete injuries relating to the collection of
their biometric identifiers.188 In 2019, though, the tides turned
against corporate actors seeking to either dismiss cases or win summary judgment on standing grounds.189 In Patel v. Facebook, the
Ninth Circuit became the first appellate court to hold that biometric
privacy violations under BIPA suffice to confer Article III standing.190 There, the plaintiffs disputed Facebook’s Tag Suggestions,
which used facial recognition technology to identify potential subjects in users’ photos. The court determined that Facebook’s facial
recognition technology could obtain information that is “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,” which would otherwise be
near-impossible without such technology.191 After generating face
templates, companies can use them to identify and locate individuals
with unprecedented precision.192 The bare risk of such surveillance
harms invades an individual’s private affairs and concrete interests.193
185

Id.
Id. at 1097.
187
Erin Jane Illman, Data Privacy Laws Targeting Biometric and Geolocation
Technologies, 73 BUS. LAW., Feb. 2019, at 191, 193.
188
See Rivera v. Google Inc. (Rivera II), 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
189 See generally Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019); Rosenbach v. Six
Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197 (Ill. 2019).
190 Patel, 932 F.3d at 1275; see also Janice Lopez, A Looming Dystopia? Facial
Recognition Software Proliferates Privacy Concerns, AM. UNIV. BUS. L. REV.,
https://aublr.org/2020/03/a-looming-dystopia-facial-recognition-software-proliferatesprivacy-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/Q3ZA-8879].
191
Patel, 932 F.3d at 1273 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216
(2018)).
192
Id.
193 Id.
186

2022]

FACE THE FACTS

1045

With the case prepared to proceed, Facebook settled the class
action lawsuit for $550 million.194 However, the district court worried that the judgment was under-compensatory.195 In addition to
raising the settlement to $650 million, Facebook changed its facial
recognition settings to require users to opt-in to the setting.196 As a
result of Facebook’s settlement, class action plaintiffs have set their
eyes on BIPA class litigation.197 But now that Facebook set the
standard for valuing BIPA settlements, few defendants will be able
to afford settling their claims, cornering them into litigation. With
the case law increasingly weighing against them, facial recognition
technologists, like Clearview, have one more avenue to pursue: undermine BIPA on constitutional grounds.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION
The First Amendment makes for a charming ally. Eugene Volokh, chief among its proponents, caused a stir among privacy academics when he professed that rights to information privacy are presumptively in conflict with the First Amendment.198 He argues that
contracts suffice to defend our privacy and assuage concerns over
illicit disclosures.199 However, consumers have few bargaining resources at their disposal relative to corporate actors. More often,
they forfeit personal information without fully understanding the cumulative effects of such forfeitures.200 Volokh’s contract model

194

See Natasha Singer & Mike Isaac, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle Facial
Recognition Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/
technology/facebook-privacy-lawsuit-earnings.html [https://perma.cc/6NNF-98HV].
195
See David Oberly, Impact of Facebook $650 Million Patel BIPA Settlement,
BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Aug. 20, 2020, 3:42 PM), https://www.biometricupdate.com/
202008/impact-of-facebook-650-million-patel-bipa-settlement
[https://perma.cc/L285RMV5].
196
Id.
197 Id.
198 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN L. REV. 1049,
1051 (2000) (“We already have a code of ‘fair information practices,’ and it is the First
Amendment . . . .”).
199 Id. at 1057–63.
200
See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183, 1200 (2016).
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contributes to a legacy where “the strong do what they can and the
weak suffer what they must.”
Volokh recognized a significant limit to the contract model and
offered that customs should traverse certain contexts and imply contractual obligations.201 However, implied obligations would only incentivize companies to provide explicit disclosures in their privacy
policies that stipulate how they collect, store, use, and sell information. Jack Balkin offers a remedy to this issue, extending platforms’ obligations to consumers under fiduciary theories.202 For
Balkin, consumers’ relationships of trust and confidence with platforms give rise to their fiduciary duties not to use consumers’ information to their detriment.203
Like doctor and lawyer contexts, asymmetries of knowledge and
information should require platforms to protect our information and
only use it to our benefit.204 Yet companies frame this benefit in privacy policies in terms of enabling user personalization. These predictive schemes enshrine data collection practices as mutually beneficial, though they tread a fine line between accommodating and
manipulating these experiences. Employing explicit language in privacy policies and prescribing fiduciary duties to platforms are only
effective to the extent that we reckon with the nature of the benefit
platforms are according us.
Neither Volokh’s implied contract model nor Balkin’s information fiduciary model adequately responds to third-party beneficiaries to our data disclosures and vulnerabilities online. Privacy
policies only enumerate the obligations that parties in privity—platforms and their users—owe to each other. Any reciprocal benefit is
confined to their discrete relationship. However, when privacy policies caution users that their disclosures are visible to the public,
they give free rein to third-party observation and associated risks
that data may be used in other contexts. Recent case law has
201

See Volokh, supra note 198, at 1057–58 (“In many contexts, people reasonably
expect—because of custom, course of dealing with the other party, or all the other factors
that are relevant to finding an implied contract—that part of what their contracting partner
is promising is confidentiality.”).
202 Balkin, supra note 200, at 1205–34.
203
Id. at 1208.
204 See id. at 1209, 1221.
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complicated this further, suggesting that by revoking access to otherwise publicly available information, platforms risk generating information monopolies.205
The problem of data scrapers therefore elicits new First Amendment concerns in the digital sphere. In a recent interview, Clearview
CEO Ton-That suggested that all the data contained in Clearview is
“publicly available” on the internet.206 Analogizing Clearview’s facial recognition capacities to Google, he remarked, “it’s like a
Google search for faces. You put in a face, you get . . . a lead. It’s
like Googling someone’s name.”207 Except Clearview’s software
operates differently than Google’s. Any number of individuals may
share your name, but no one shares your face.208 Ton-That shies
away from this meaningful technical difference with Google’s “reverse image search.”209 Google’s service analyzes an image to determine its unique features—its lines, colors, and textures, for example—to generate a query that matches the image to a database of
billions of images.210 Their algorithm returns search results containing matching or “visually similar” images.211 Whereas Google’s reverse image search returns the same image, Clearview returns the
205

HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.3d 985, 1005 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated 141 S.
Ct. 2752 (2021).
206 See This Week in Startups, supra note 160.
207
Id.
208 In recent years, technologists have been working toward mitigating the “Evil Twin”
dilemma, where facial recognition technology tends to have difficulty discerning between
identical twins. See Jack Purcher, Apple Advances Face ID to Be ‘Twin Proof’ Using
Machine Learning, Subepidermal Imaging and More, PATENTLY APPLE (Mar. 14, 2019,
8:48 AM), https://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2019/03/apple-advances-faceid-to-be-twin-proof-using-machine-learning-subepidermal-imaging-and-more.html
[https://perma.cc/2QLJ-SHKL]. Subepidermal imaging of more discrete biometric
components—such as blood vessels—provides one avenue for aiding such differentiation
capacities. Id. (“Unlike some other facial features on the surface of the skin of a user’s face,
veins in the subepidermal layers of the face are typically unique to an individual and vein
patterns are different between different individuals, even siblings or twins. Thus,
assessment of the veins (and vein patterns) in the subepidermal layers of the face may be
used to distinguish between siblings, twins, or other users with similar facial features on
the surface of the face.”).
209 Search with an Image, G
OOGLE, https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/
1325808?p=searchbyimagepage&hl=en [https://perma.cc/XX6N-5L9M].
210 See Google, How Search by Image Works, YOUTUBE (July 20, 2011), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=keTZaJg0784 [https://perma.cc/FVR4-WHA2].
211 Id.

1048

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXXII:1010

same person. Their queries internalize different languages. Rather
than apprehending the whole image, Clearview extracts the constitutive elements of the image, namely the biometric features internal
to them, to render its analysis. This difference is not trivial.
Critics of the company’s surveillance mechanisms bemoan an
Orwellian future in sight, claiming that the company “might end privacy as we know it.”212 Dystopian fears over government-sanctioned surveillance abound, giving life to the adage “who watches
the watchmen?” Existing case law may enable Clearview to exploit
public information for its own benefit.213 Without formal constraints
on Clearview’s data scraping practices, the company joins the ranks
of other powerful corporate actors depreciating First Amendment
values.214

212

Hill, supra note 6.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 2752 (2021)
(No. 19-1116) (“Users do not expect, or consent to, the exploitation of their personal
information in perpetuity by third parties that the users and the website owner did not
authorize and whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the owners of that
personal information.”).
214 See Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 W . & M
M
ARY L. REV. 1119,
1120 (2015) (“The contemporary First Amendment must be situated within a larger story
about the realignment of information flows within circuits of power that serve emerging
global interests, and to tell that story, one must look to disputes about the speech
implications of private economic regulation. As a result of that struggle, free speech
jurisprudence about information rights and harms is becoming what is best described as a
zombie free speech jurisprudence: a body of doctrine robbed of its animating spirit of
expressive equality and enslaved in the service of economic power.”); see also Jameel
Jaffer & Ramya Krishnan, Clearview AI’s First Amendment Theory Threatens Privacy—
and Speech, Too, SLATE (Nov. 17, 2020, 1:21 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2020/
11/clearview-ai-first-amendment-illinois-lawsuit.html
[https://perma.cc/U8F3-RGGA]
(“Technology companies have learned that an effective way to protect lucrative business
practices from regulation is to characterize those practices as free speech. Google has been
arguing, with some success in the lower courts, that judges should deal with any effort to
regulate its search engine in the same way they’d deal with efforts to censor the Wall Street
Journal. In Maine, internet service providers are arguing that the First Amendment protects
their right to use and sell their customers’ sensitive data without their consent. Earlier this
fall, President Donald Trump issued an executive order meant to shut down TikTok, the
video-sharing platform. The company sued, arguing that the order violated the First
Amendment because TikTok runs on code, and code is speech.”); Balkin, supra note 200,
at 1186 (discussing how the First Amendment has become “the most fertile source of
constitutional defenses to business regulation”); Tim Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation:
How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013),
213
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With the Constitution as its battleground, Clearview asserts a
free speech right to collect and disseminate publicly available photos.215 Although this Note argues otherwise, such a practice may
warrant constitutional protection,216 if it was what Clearview’s algorithm actually does. The software’s sophistication exceeds the facial recognition capacities of similar programs run by the U.S. government and other Silicon Valley giants.217 Given that Clearview
defends its practice on First Amendment grounds,218 the difference
implicates a fundamental tension over whether people, rather than
their images, are reducible to language—and, if so, whether others
can lay claim to them. With BIPA on the table, it may also determine
whether our biometric privacy is incompatible with the First
Amendment.
A. Matter of Public Concern
The United States remains among the strongest proponents of
free speech.219 That right comes with an expansive, though limited,
license to engage in speech. And, unsurprisingly, it carries a history
contending over what qualifies as speech. Without exhausting many
decades’ worth of literature arguing that everything is speech, we

https://newrepublic.com/article/113294/how-corporations-hijacked-first-amendmentevade-regulation [https://perma.cc/4EJF-A4FF].
215 Kashmir Hill, Facial Recognition Start-Up Mounts a First Amendment Defense, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/technology/clearview-floyd-abrams.html?
[https://perma.cc/A3SR-TTT7] (Mar. 18, 2021).
216 See Adam Schwartz, Clearview’s Face Surveillance Still Has No First Amendment
Defense, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 13, 2021), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/
07/clearviews-face-surveillance-still-has-no-first-amendment-defense
[https://perma.cc/H339-3YF2].
217 Hill, supra note 6 (“Its nationwide database of images is much larger, and unlike
FACES [Florida’s state-provided facial recognition tool], Clearview’s algorithm doesn’t
require photos of people looking straight at the camera. ‘With Clearview, you can use
photos that aren’t perfect,’ Sergeant Ferrara said. ‘A person can be wearing a hat or glasses,
or it can be a profile shot or partial view of their face.’”).
218 Schwartz, supra note 216.
219
See Richard Wike & Katie Simmons, Global Support for Principle of Free
Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 18, 2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-freeexpression-but-opposition-to-some-forms-of-speech/ [https://perma.cc/4CND-W47A].
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might say instead that “speech is everywhere.”220 But not all speech
warrants a legal battle, let alone merits legal protection.
In its most popular iterations, unprotected speech may involve
instances of incitement, obscenity, fighting words, threats, and
falsely shouting “fire” in theatres.221 Less obviously, there are product labeling requirements, securities disclosures and nondisclosures,
and restraints on workplace speech.222 In these latter circumstances,
regulations over speech are so ubiquitous that they sublimate into
our everyday norms for engaging and exercising speech.223 Failing
to appreciate their existence does not make them any less operative.
Indeed, in the context of the First Amendment’s privacy jurisprudence, these norms not only circumscribe what constitutes speech,
but also define whether individuals are entitled to privacy over that
speech.
In their ACLU amicus brief, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(“EFF”) noted that the First Amendment protects not only expression, but also the necessary predicates that enable expression, including the collection and creation of information.224 Emphasizing
the right of listeners—the recipients of speech—the group drew an
analogy to recording on-duty law enforcement officers.225 As the
Seventh Circuit found, “[t]he right to publish or broadcast an audio
or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if
the antecedent act of making the recording is wholly

220

RICHARDS, supra note 53, at 86.
Id.
222
Id.
223 Terming this phenomenon “First Amendment salience,” Frederick Schauer argues
that our understanding of the First Amendment is limited to those concerns which courts
address. However, an overwhelming majority of speech regulations, such as those
pertaining to antitrust or sexual harassment, receive little judicial scrutiny. Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004).
224 Adam Schwartz & Andrew Crocker, Clearview’s Faceprinting is Not Sheltered from
Biometric Privacy Litigation by the First Amendment, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 5,
2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/11/clearviews-faceprinting-not-shelteredbiometric-privacy-litigation-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/EQ28-K3CT].
225
Id.; see also Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in
Living: Libraries, the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied
Right to Receive Information, 74 U. MO.-KAN. CITY L. REV. 799 (2006) (endorsing a First
Amendment right to receive information).
221
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unprotected.”226 On this basis, EFF concluded that Clearview’s data
collection was permitted.227
But the group missed a core tenet of First Amendment jurisprudence. Law enforcement officers acting in their official capacity are
necessarily acting, ostensibly, in the public interest. They are accountable for on-duty conduct; their comportment is, in the jurisprudence’s terms, “a matter of public concern.”228 The recording takes
place in public and concerns public officials acting for the public.
Indeed, speech does not harness the power to become of public concern on its own. It exists relative to the interests and intentions of its
speakers and audience, and the general context in which it occurs.
This context is often reduced to its spatial elements: speech occurred
in public—therefore it must have been for the public.229
Here, the public is both a fiction of place and person. Part of this
argument relies on the premise that the ability to curtail the “capture
of public images” would “truncate recollection and discussion of
matters experienced by the community, and [] effectively edit the
community’s memory.”230 But memory will exist irrespective of
whether we are conscious of it. The issue is less about memory as
such than on what terms we can control, manipulate, and prolong it.
By conflating information access and collection—and confusing

226

ACLU of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Seth F. Kreimer,
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to
Record, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 404 (2011) (“[W]e must distinguish between the capture
and the distribution of images. The interest in avoiding outside observation depends
primarily on the distribution of captured images. An invited observer who records images
of her own interactions for her own future review has not subjected private occurrences to
unconsented public examination. Recording the image preserves memories of the
observer’s own life, and in most situations it is implausible—and of dubious
constitutionality—to imply an agreement to forgo her own memory.”).
227 Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation at 5, ACLU v. Clearview AI,
Inc., No. 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 5, 2020) [hereinafter EFF Amicus].
228
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
229 See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 226, at 402; see also Bambauer, supra note 21, at 84–
86 (arguing that the right to collect and create information implies a right to record in
public). For further discussion of the right to record under the First Amendment, see
Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 177–99 (2017).
230 Kreimer, supra note 226, at 402.
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collection with recollection—the argument muddies the line between speech and conduct, which carry distinct legal protections.231
The Court struck this gentle balance in Bartnicki v. Vopper.232
There, a teachers union engaged in collective bargaining negotiations with the school board.233 These negotiations were contentious
and received significant media attention.234 Bartnicki, the union’s
chief negotiator, phoned the union’s president to discuss the status
of negotiations.235 During the call, Bartnicki mentioned going to the
board members’ homes and “blow[ing] off their front porches.”236
An unidentified third party intercepted and recorded the call, later
delivering the recording to union opponents.237 The opponents then
provided the tape to Vopper, a radio commentator, who broadcasted
the recording.238 After Bartnicki brought suit against Vopper for federal and state wiretapping violations, the Court was faced with a
vexing dilemma: does the First Amendment protect subsequent disclosures of lawfully obtained information when the source of that
information obtained the information unlawfully?239
The Court permitted the subsequent disclosure, finding that the
relevant statute’s “naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly
characterized as a regulation of pure speech.”240 Accordingly, the
statute could not suppress a law-abiding possessor of information’s
disclosure in order to deter a non-law-abiding third party’s conduct.241 This is particularly true where speech regulations sanction
the publication of matters of public concern.242 The Court went to
great lengths to disclaim any endorsement of illicit information231

See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[S]peech which . . .
is tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct may itself be legitimately
proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of
generally applicable statutes.”).
232
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 514.
233 Id. at 518.
234
Id.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 518–19.
237
Id.
238 Id. at 519.
239
Id. at 528.
240 Id. at 526.
241
Id. at 529–30.
242 Id. at 533–34.
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gathering practices, reiterating that “[t]he essential thrust of the First
Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or
publish when others wish him to be quiet.”243
Bartnicki is characteristic of the Court’s general apprehension
against sweeping privacy holdings.244 Where the First Amendment
conflicts with privacy rights, the Court is particular about limiting
its holding to the instant facts, careful not to exceed the appropriate
context and render a categorical deprivation of privacy.245 In reaching its decision, the Court paid homage to Justice Brandeis, signaling that one of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy.246
Although Bartnicki remains good law, it stands out as a pariah.
Writing ten years after the decision, one commentator noted, “[i]n
no case reported to date has the holding in Bartnicki been applied to
reach a similar conclusion in an analogous case.”247 However, the
case remains clear for its proposition that regulations of matters of
public concern deserve greater scrutiny than private matters.248 As
the Court discussed in Snyder v. Phelps, “speech concerning public
affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”249 Restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns.250 Private matters depart
from the First Amendment’s essence to protect robust debate of public issues and enable a meaningful dialogue of ideas.251
Vesting facial recognition technologies in the hands of private
developers plays a pivotal role in considering whether Clearview’s
243

Id. at 532 n.20 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 559 (1985)).
244
Id. at 529.
245 See id.
246
Id. at 534.
247 Eric Easton, Ten Years After: Bartnicki v. Vopper as a Laboratory for First
Amendment Advocacy and Analysis, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 287, 334 (2011).
248
Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (“[W]here matters of purely private
significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.”).
249
Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)).
250 Id.
251
Id. (citing Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (internal citations
omitted)); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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data collection constitutes a matter of public concern. The company
is, in the most immediate sense, primarily motivated to profit from
their software. Their algorithm indiscriminately collects massive
swaths of personal data, with little reason to believe that any particular individual whose data it collects engaged in matters of public
concern.252 The implication bears dire consequences on two fronts.
1. Algorithms as Subjects, Not Speech
Clearview interprets algorithms as speech rather than subjects.
The Framers undoubtedly lacked the foresight to determine whether
algorithms qualify as speech. But, at a more rudimentary level, they
did establish the First Amendment to protect human speech.253 The
First Amendment has, in Tim Wu’s view, “wandered far from its
purposes when it is recruited to protect commercial automatons
from regulatory scrutiny.”254 Though algorithms require initial human input, increasing sophistication in AI development and machine learning renders their code autonomous.255 To the extent that
courts imbue algorithms with what are foremost human rights,256
they risk elevating self-sufficient (and, dare I say, self-conscious) 257
machines above ourselves.258

252

See EFF Amicus, supra note 227, at 9; cf. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536 (1989)
(holding that the First Amendment protected a newspaper’s publication of a rape victim’s
name because it obtained the victim’s name lawfully and, the nature of the information—
a public criminal proceeding—ascribed its public significance).
253 Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/opinion/free-speech-for-computers.html
[https://perma.cc/GJ3Y-D9NX].
254 Id.
255
See, e.g., Bruce Schneier, Autonomous Everything: How Algorithms Are Taking Over
Our World, LITERARY HUB (Oct. 1, 2018), https://lithub.com/autonomous-everything-howalgorithms-re-taking-over-our-world/ [https://perma.cc/4T5R-UX66].
256 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445–50 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that computer code and programs merit First Amendment protection); Junger v.
Daley, 203 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the First Amendment protects
encryption code).
257
Christof Koch, Will Machines Ever Become Conscious?, SCI. AM. (Dec. 1, 2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-machines-ever-become-conscious/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2022); Hugh Howey, How to Build a Self-Conscious Machine, WIRED (Oct.
4, 2017, 6:55 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-to-build-a-self-conscious-aimachine/ [https://perma.cc/JV4D-LYUC].
258 See Wu, supra note 253.
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The First Amendment accords varying levels of protection to
speech.259 The preliminary inquiry latent and often taken for granted
in these cases is whether a person conveys that speech. For example,
in Universal City Studios v. Corley, the Second Circuit expressed
that “[c]ommunication does not lose its constitutional protection as
‘speech’ simply because it is expressed in the language of computer
code.”260 The court considered code like mathematical formulae and
musical scores, whose symbolic notations may be “[in]comprehensible to the uninitiated” yet no less deserving of First Amendment
protection.261 If, for instance, someone wrote their novel entirely in
binary code, the resulting inquiry would not ask whether the novel
was in English.262 But the argument does not concern whether language or its manifestation is protectible. Rather, it relates the speech
to its subject.
Algorithms trouble precisely what makes us human because they
appropriate our traditional categories of assimilation. We only understand each other by way of language, but as the Second Circuit
seemed to suggest, all language is symbolic.263 Indeed, in language,
there are only differences.264 For the first time, non-human subjects
internalize our languages and communicate with our symbols. An
algorithm, no less than a person, thinks; it registers meaning and reacts to linguistic stimuli. The Second Circuit’s conclusion that code
conveys information by virtue of its instructional nature therefore
misplaces the importance of the speaker’s agency in such conveyances.265 Code may perform discrete functions that are

259

See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
See Corley, 273 F.3d at 445.
261 Id.
262
Id. at 445–46.
263 Id.
264 F
ERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, Identities, Realities, Values, in COURSE IN GENERAL
LINGUISTICS 107, 120 (Charles Bally & Albert Sechehaye eds., Wade Baskin trans., N.Y.
Phil. Libr. 1959) (1916) (“Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has
neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and
phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a
sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it.”).
265 Corley, 273 F.3d at 447–48.
260
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communicable to other developers, but algorithms employ code to
address systematic inquiries. In other words, algorithms speak
through code.266
2. Government Surveillance Insights
Clearview identifies its software as a research tool for law enforcement agencies.267 However, there is a disjunction between its
mass biometric data collection and its use of such data for law enforcement purposes. By touting its allegiance to law enforcement,
Clearview plays into an age-old tradition of excusing privacy intrusions on the basis of public safety.268 Underlying its practice,
though, is a more insidious surveillance that not only harms our tangible privacy interests, but erodes our foundation for intimating others. While its technology is only one degree removed from the location-tracking surveillance found reprehensible in Carpenter, it recapitulates the Court’s very concern that identifying and tracking people would reveal their “familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.”269
With respect to government surveillance, courts have been unwilling to take the bait.270 In 2013, the Guardian released its seminal
article detailing the National Security Agency’s collaboration with
Verizon to collect telephone records on an “ongoing, daily basis.”271
266

For an insightful discussion of whether algorithms speak and, if so, whether their
speech is entitled to First Amendment protections, see Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U.
PA. L. REV. 1495, 1517–24 (2013).
267
Introducing Clearview AI 2.0, CLEARVIEW AI, https://clearview.ai/ [https://perma.cc/
56NZ-RNDT].
268 See Jon Evans, Personal Privacy vs. Public Security, T
ECHCRUNCH (May 6, 2018,
9:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/05/06/personal-privacy-vs-public-security-fight/
[https://perma.cc/W753-QDHU].
269
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (citing United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
270
See id. at 2223; see also Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated
sub nom, Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d 599 (D.C. Cir. 2015); ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d
787 (2d Cir. 2015).
271
Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers
Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013, 6:05 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order (last visited Apr. 19, 2022); see also Ewen
Macaskill & Gabriel Dance, NSA Files: Decoded, GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-filessurveillance-revelations-decoded [https://perma.cc/4RMF-GTSV].
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The Snowden leaks, in common parlance, culminated in a lawsuit
against the Obama administration for collecting millions of Americans’ communication records “indiscriminately and in bulk—regardless of whether they are suspected of any wrongdoing.”272
Through its Bulk Telephony Metadata Program, the government
created “an historical repository that permits retrospective analysis.”273 In its defense, the government asserted that the program
served the “programmatic purpose of identifying unknown terrorist
operatives and preventing terrorist attacks.”274 But the government
failed to cite a single instance in which analysis of its data collection
actually stopped an imminent attack.275 The government hoped to
appeal to an ideologically entrenched memory—or trauma—in the
American psyche to justify large-scale privacy intrusions. Yet, as
the court pronounced, Americans could very well combat terrorism
in perpetuity.276
In Klayman v. Obama, the court limited its analysis to the Fourth
Amendment, though the same program came under fire two years
later.277 While Klayman scrutinized the sheer volume of information
available under the program, the Second Circuit focused instead on
the quality of information.278 The program enabled the government
to receive metadata concerning every phone call made or received
using Verizon for an indefinite period of time.279 The court mentioned:
The records demanded are not those of suspects under investigation, or of people or businesses that have
contact with such subjects, or of people or businesses
that have contact with others who are in contact with

272

Klayman, 957 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
Id. at 10, 15.
274 Id. at 39 (internal quotations omitted).
275
Id. at 40.
276 Id. at 32 (“[T]here is the very real prospect that the program will go on for as long as
America is combatting terrorism, which realistically could be forever!”).
277 See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
278
Id. at 813.
279 Id.
273
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the subjects—they extend to every record that exists,
and indeed to records that do not yet exist.280
Such a program not only implicates Fourth Amendment privacy
rights, but First Amendment ones as well. Collecting data at this
scale discourages associational privacies and substantially impairs
the precursors to maintaining meaningful relationships.
Courts decline to address First Amendment privacy claims when
the Fourth Amendment suffices to address the issue at bar.281 But,
in declining to grapple with the First Amendment implications, they
surrender free speech to corporate actors. The First Amendment incurs Fourth Amendment privacy concerns because we lack adequate
safeguards against data transfers to law enforcement agencies.282
Corporate actors have every incentive to collaborate with law enforcement agencies; the government awards handsome contracts.283
But collaborating with law enforcement agencies to protect against
abstract threats fails to satisfy the nexus to determine whether the
data collection itself is of public concern.284 To hold otherwise
280

Id. (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., id. The Second Circuit avoided reaching conclusions on any constitutional
questions, though they appreciated that these concerns played an integral role in their
decision and its consequences. Id. See generally Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112 (2007).
282
But see Molly Davis, Utah Just Became a Leader in Digital Privacy, WIRED (Mar. 22,
2019,
8:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/utah-digital-privacy-legislation/
[https://perma.cc/DV9X-9QSK] (discussing Utah’s Electronic Information or Data Privacy
Act, which requires law enforcement to obtain a warrant to access any electronic data held
by third parties). While Fourth Amendment analyses are beyond the scope of this Note, I
am inclined to suggest that First Amendment protections for corporate data collection and
transfers to law enforcement agencies enable the government to circumvent procedural
requirements for obtaining warrants and effectively swallow the Fourth Amendment’s
third-party doctrine.
283
See, e.g., Kim Lyons, ICE Just Signed a Contract with Facial Recognition Company
Clearview AI, VERGE (Aug. 14, 2020, 3:19 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/
14/21368930/clearview-ai-ice-contract-privacy-immigration (last visited Apr. 19, 2022);
McKenzie Funk, How ICE Picks Its Targets in the Surveillance Age, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/magazine/ice-surveillance-deportation.html
[https://perma.cc/69EY-6U2H] (June 7, 2021).
284 Joel Reidenberg resolves the tension endemic to the First Amendment and privacy by
proposing a “public significance filter.” Rather than focus on the observability of
information, namely that such information is accessible to the public, Reidenberg insists
that courts should focus on the nature of the information to determine its public
significance. See Reidenberg, supra note 168, at 155; see also Balkin, supra note 200, at
281
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would shield corporate actors’ profit motivations under the guise of
public safety. More explicitly, it obscures “public safety” into a platitude for judicial appeasement.
B. Viewpoint Discrimination
Clearview continues to hang its hat on a baseless First Amendment line.285 Its principal contention is that its application and computer code are protected speech. Citing a host of cases requiring
strict scrutiny standards of review, Clearview seeks to undermine
the legitimacy of privacy-based regulations by insisting that they
discriminate against content.286 But the more difficult question is
determining whether its application speaks in the first place and, if
so, whether it is Clearview that is speaking.287
Clearview—and even civil liberties groups like the EFF—insist
that “code is speech.”288 At its core, the determination presupposes
that all human manifestations of speech will continue, even in their
functional capacities, as human speech. Even if courts adhere to this
fiction, there are ample ways to reconceptualize the formula from
“code is speech” to “code can be speech.”
For example, just a year prior to its decision in Corley, the Second Circuit considered whether a software program that analyzes
futures market transactions and immediately signals users to buy or
sell futures contracts was protectible speech.289 Because the program functioned as an automatic trading program, it did not serve
any editorial or otherwise informative capacities.290 To be sure, the
court emphasized that language was involved in conveying the program’s commands to its users but only “in an entirely mechanical

1205 (“[C]ertain kinds of information constitute matters of private concern not because of
their content, but because of the social relationships that produce them.”).
285 See, e.g., State v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 226-3-20 Cncv, slip op. at 9–10 (Vt. Super.
Ct. Sept. 10, 2020).
286 Id. (citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015)).
287
Id. at 12.
288 Schwartz & Crocker, supra note 224.
289
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2000).
290 Id. at 111.
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way . . . to induce action without the intercession of the mind or the
will of the recipient.”291
The program related little to the heart of the First Amendment.292
It failed to advance the pursuit of truth, the accommodation among
interests, the achievement of social stability, the exposure and deterrence of abuses of authority, personal autonomy and personality development, and the functioning of a democracy.293 It also misapprehended the locus of inquiry: the First Amendment does not protect
speech in the abstract; it protects us against the government limiting
our ability to speak about certain things.294 Just as the First Amendment would not protect engaging in sexual harassment or asking
someone to murder your spouse, so too are there necessary limits on
software.295 Government regulations relate to particular kinds of
speech—here, particular kinds of code—because they orient toward
particular objectives, which is to say, they target what speech
does.296
291

Id.
Id.
293 See generally Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119
(1989).
294 See Neil Richards, Apple’s “Code = Speech” Mistake, MIT T
ECH. REV. (Mar. 1,
2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/03/01/161811/apples-code-speechmistake [https://perma.cc/W2BS-P9RC] (“What matters, in the end, isn’t the metaphysics
of ‘speechiness,’ but whether a government regulation of an activity threatens the
traditional values of free expression—political dissent, art, philosophy, and the practices
of self-government.”); see also Jaffer & Krishnan, supra note 214 (“[C]ourts have looked
to the social meaning of the activity in question, asking, for instance, whether the activity
belongs to a recognized medium of expression; whether it is intended to convey a message
and whether that message is likely to be understood; and, perhaps most important, whether
the activity has the effect of informing public discourse . . . .It has always mattered to
courts, in other words, what an activity signifies, and what it is, and what it does.”).
295 Richards, supra note 294 (“Code = Speech is a fallacy because it would needlessly
treat writing the code for a malicious virus as equivalent to writing an editorial in the New
York Times.”); see also Andrew Tutt, Software Speech, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 77
(2012) (“Software is sometimes primarily concerned with conveying ideas of the kind and
in a manner that one would recognize as familiar and essential to a free society. At other
times, software functions much more like a means by which data is gathered, manipulated,
and relayed to and by a user and therefore difficult to think of as akin to ‘speech.’ Software,
in other words, should be considered not for what it is or even what it says but for what it
means to society to treat it like speech.”).
296 Eugene Volokh presumes that data privacy laws, for instance, implicate First
Amendment concerns and are generally impermissible. However, he only narrowly
considered restrictions on the communication of information without considering the
292
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Clearview’s last-ditch effort relies on the Supreme Court’s latest
decision on the First Amendment and data privacy.297 In response to
concerns about brand-name drug marketing, Vermont passed legislation addressing widespread pharmaceutical detailing, a practice
whereby manufacturers promote their drugs to physicians and solicit
physicians’ prescription practices.298 This latter category, known as
“prescriber-identifying information,” enables detailers to better determine which physicians are more likely to prescribe their medicines and how to best market their medicines to those particular physicians.299 Pharmacies regularly obtained this information as a matter of course and federal law, which they sold to data-mining
firms.300 These firms analyzed and leased their reports to manufacturers, informing their marketing techniques and enhancing their
sales opportunities.301 Vermont’s legislation prohibited the sale of
prescriber-identifying information for marketing purposes, absent
the prescriber’s consent.302 The Court determined that Vermont’s
law enacted both content-based and speaker-based restrictions on
the sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information.303
Sweeping well beyond its caution in Bartnicki, the Court declared that information is speech.304 In its view, facts are the beginning point for speech that is most essential to advance human
knowledge and to conduct human affairs.305 Facts are both formative
to and constitutive of knowledge-production. Vermont’s legislation

implications of data collection practices themselves. See Volokh, supra note 198, at 1050–
51.
297
Ronald K. L. Collins, Floyd Abrams’ March in Postmodernity: Facial Recognition
and the First Amendment, FIRE (Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.thefire.org/first-amendment267-floyd-abrams-march-into-postmodernity-facial-recognition-and-the-first-amendment/
[https://perma.cc/62T4-JKQK].
298
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557–58 (2011).
299 Id. at 558.
300
Id.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 558–59. Interestingly, Vermont—and Sorrell, by extension—use prescribers’
privacy as a proxy for consumer harms. The Court addressed privacy harms in relation to
prescribing physicians rather than affected patients, who actually bore the brunt of
manufacturers’ detailing successes. See Kaminski & Skinner-Thompson, supra note 48.
303 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64.
304
Id. at 570–71.
305 Id. at 570.
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exceeded its intentions to protect privacy because it guarded against
marketing, but not research, initiatives.306 It permitted insurers, journalists, and even the state itself to use prescriber-identifying information, just not marketers.307 Accordingly, the Act failed to advance
confidentiality interests.308 The decision effectively reduced privacy
to a truism: privacy exists against everybody or nobody.309 Divorcing it from its purposes, the Court refrained from the obvious contexts that require privacy and instead contributed to a political economy that materializes information flows to align with broader extralegal profit motivations.310
Though the Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. signaled appropriate backlash, certain criticisms overstate its breadth
and should give us pause to derive its implications for data privacy.311 The First Amendment does not protect speech so much as
it targets arbitrary restraints on the exercises thereof.312 Though the
Court pronounced that all information is speech, it was especially
concerned with legislation incapacitating certain actors from

306

Id. at 573.
Id.
308
Id.
309 Determining whether privacy exists “against” or “with” the world equally contributes
to a normative evaluation of how we conceive privacy as either an individuating or
collectivizing force. Whereas the Court implies that privacy exists against the world, that
is, as an antagonism enabling our solitude for and with ourselves, we may fare better to
think that privacy contributes to conviviality—at least in the strict etymological sense—
and cohabitation. For a broader discussion of privacy’s positive elements, see Julie E.
Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1918–27 (2013) (arguing that
privacy and regulation are compatible with and necessary for self-constitution and
innovation).
310 See Cohen, supra note 214, at 1132 (“Both developments [in commercial speech
jurisprudence and free speech rights of corporations generally] reflect an economic reality
in which information has increasingly become untethered from industrial production to
become a source of value in its own right, and in which powerful interests that profit from
information-related activities have systematically resisted regulatory oversight.”); see also
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy,
36 VT. L. REV. 855, 868 (“[Sorrell] governs all information disclosure. In other words, all
sales or disclosures of information in the possession of the speaker constitute fully
protected speech under the First Amendment.”).
311 See, e.g., Neil Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1501, 1521–22 (2015); Bhagwat, supra note 310, at 868.
312 See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
307
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engaging in speech.313 Notwithstanding legitimate debate over
whether corporate marketing should be entitled to heightened scrutiny, Sorrell is principally a case about speaker-based discrimination; it entitles corporate actors to engage in and benefit from the
same speech as lay persons.314
Turning to Clearview, this helps clarify why the company’s First
Amendment arguments are a lost cause. BIPA provides an indiscriminate ban on nonconsensual biometric data collection. Out of an
abundance of caution, the legislation prohibits data that is most integral to our ability to interface in the world. It appeals to growing
public concern that major national corporations will manipulate our
biometric data and render it insecure, putting us at heightened risk
for irreparable forms of identity theft. But BIPA does not discriminate between permissible or impermissible purposes; nonconsensual
biometric data collection is, in itself, the issue. Nor does it discriminate among actors. The Act prohibits “private entities”—including
individuals and corporations alike—from engaging in such practices
and requires them to comply with a host of requirements to secure
biometric data. Competing First Amendment interests inform Illinois’s legislation: it designates privacy as a precondition to free
speech. As critics of facial recognition technologies recognize, surveillance not only encroaches on our privacy, but also undermines
core civil liberties.315 Absent from these criticisms, though, is the
more dire possibility that biometric data will be used to undermine
our autonomy to exercise subjectivity; it risks someone interfacing
in the world as ourselves.316
313

Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 570–71.
Id. at 565.
315 See, e.g., Jaffer & Krishnan, supra note 214 (“Facial recognition in particular is an
immensely powerful form of surveillance whose abuse could fundamentally undermine
civil liberties, including the liberties the First Amendment is meant to protect. Clearview’s
technology highlights these dangers. The company’s app would allow anyone to identify
the protesters who attended a particular political rally, or to identify the people who entered
a particular house of worship or medical clinic.”); see also generally Margot Kaminski &
Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance,
Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 465 (2015) (arguing that, in addition to
chilling speech, surveillance induces conformity with majority opinions).
316 See Kashmir Hill & Jeremy White, Designed to Deceive: Do These People Look Real
to You?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/21/
science/artificial-intelligence-fake-people-faces.html
[https://perma.cc/K9B8-6Q8W];
314
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C. Data Collection Is Speech-Related Conduct
Perhaps more obvious is that regulating Clearview’s data collection only incidentally burdens speech.317 Regulating such practices
merely targets “speech-related” conduct.318 In Hill, Colorado passed
a statute that made it unlawful to solicit or otherwise engage someone in oral protest outside of medical facilities.319 However, it made
no reference to the kinds of speech disallowed and did not infringe
on the rights of willing listeners.320 Rather, it mended the relationship between addressing a willing audience and protecting listeners
from unwanted communication.321 As the Court mentioned, the statute does not regulate speech so much as it regulates places where
speech might occur, particularly when pedestrians do not consent to
such approaches.322
Today, the Supreme Court maintains two distinct regimes respecting its speech-related conduct jurisprudence. On the one side,
Hill permits content-neutral regulation in public places precisely

Pierluigi Paganini, 3D Models Based on Facebook Images Can Fool Facial Recognition
Systems, CYBER DEF. MAG. (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.cyberdefensemagazine.com/3dmodels-based-on-facebook-images-can-fool-facial-recognition-systems/
[https://perma.cc/8UF3-59BU].
317
See Balkin, supra note 200, at 1196 (“One might argue that data, when collected,
collated, used, and sold in bulk, is not speech at all. Rather, it is a commodity, like widgets
or soybeans. Vermont made this argument in Sorrell; although the Court did not decide the
question, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion seemed skeptical.”). But see Bambauer,
supra note 21, at 63 (“[F]or all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the
current debates in information law, data is speech. Privacy regulations are rarely incidental
burdens to knowledge. Instead, they are deliberately designed to disrupt knowledge
creation.”).
318 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000). As Neil Richards argues, privacy laws
seldom implicate First Amendment concerns because they relate to information-gathering
practices rather than information itself. See Richards, supra note 30, at 1189.
319
Hill, 530 U.S. at 707–08.
320 Id. at 708.
321
Id. at 717 (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 204 (1921)) (“We are a social people and the accosting by one of another in an
inoffensive way and an offer by one to communicate and discuss information with a view
to influencing the other’s action are not regarded as aggression or a violation of that other’s
rights. If, however, the offer is declined, as it may rightfully be, then persistence,
importunity, following and dogging become unjustifiable annoyance and obstruction
which is likely soon to savor of intimidation. From all of this the person sought to be
influenced has a right to be free, and his employer has a right to have him free.”).
322 Id. at 719–20.
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because it regulates a public place rather than conduct.323 On the
other side—and more recently—the Court has interrogated whether
the First Amendment permits regulating speech in public. In Snyder
v. Phelps, the Westboro Baptist Church protested a military funeral,
garnishing signs that read a host of inflammatory, if not outright pejorative, slurs.324 The plaintiffs alleged state law tort claims, including defamation, publicity given to private life, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, intrusion upon seclusion, and civil conspiracy,
but did not point to any legislative regulation.325 In spite of the
Church’s grotesque speech, the Court held firmly to the principle
that speech which offends ordinary sensibility deserves protection.326 Of particular importance, the Court applauded the Church’s
compliance with public officials’ instructions for staging their
demonstration, but made no comment on the First Amendment implications of public officials delegating where protests can happen
in the first place.327 Nor did they expound on the differences between exercising First Amendment rights against common law
causes of action as opposed to explicit regulations.
Taking Hill as its inspiration, Massachusetts enacted a similar
statute that barred solicitations and counseling outside of abortion
clinics.328 Except, unlike the Colorado statute, Massachusetts outlawed knowingly standing on a public way within the clinics’ vicinity.329 Despite the law having the “inevitable effect” of restricting
abortion-related speech, the Court determined that the otherwise facially neutral law does not become content-based by virtue of its

323

Id.
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011).
325 Id. at 450.
326
Id. at 460–61 (“Westboro’s funeral picketing is certainly hurtful and its contribution
to public discourse may be negligible. But Westboro addressed matters of public import on
public property, in a peaceful manner, in full compliance with the guidance of local
officials. . . . Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both
joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot
react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different
course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle
public debate.”).
327 Id.
328
McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 469–70 (2014).
329 Id.
324
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disproportionate effect on certain kinds of speech.330 Massachusetts
failed to demonstrate that its law narrowly served governmental interests in preserving public safety because it banned standing, as opposed to soliciting, by the clinics.331 The Court’s decision can best
be understood as differentiating between regulations against being
in public versus doing something in public. The former disables a
portion of a “traditional public forum,” which curtails the possibility
for speech to occur at all.332 The latter, on the other hand, targets a
relational action; it bars certain ways of conveying information to
others within a given context rather than encroaching on its access
to be in public and access information therein.
Clearview’s facial recognition technology offends First Amendment jurisprudence, conflating access to data with its more insidious
data-collection conduct. All the more so, corporate actors operating
such technologies turn the internet into a microcosm for our world
without appropriating its prevailing norms about privacy. We do not
need new privacy norms to define our digital lives; the “real world”
and “digital world” is a false dichotomy.333 Our existing norms suffice to draw analogies to our digital lives and satisfy demands for
our continued privacy. The internet reiterates a template for a world
we already inhabit.334 By infiltrating social media networks to
330

Id. at 480.
Id. at 494 (“Although respondents claim that Massachusetts ‘tried other laws already
on the books,’ they identify not a single prosecution brought under those laws within at
least the last 17 years.” (citation omitted)).
332 Id. at 497.
333 In light of digital reconfigurations of norms surrounding in- and co-habitation,
academics and artists have indulged new philosophical discussions about “worlding.” For
more thorough discussions of the concept, see Ian Cheng, Worlding Raga: 2—What Is a
World?, RIBBONFARM (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.ribbonfarm.com/2019/03/05/worldingraga-2-what-is-a-world/ [https://perma.cc/24ZG-LQJJ]; Helen Palmer & Vicky Hunter,
Worlding, NEW MATERIALISM (Mar. 16, 2018), https://newmaterialism.eu/almanac/w/
worlding.html [https://perma.cc/6KXB-B87N].
334 In response to Google entering their property to photograph their home for Google
Maps, a couple brought suit against the company for intrusion upon seclusion. Boring v.
Google Inc., 362 Fed. App’x. 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2010). The court determined:
331

“No person of ordinary sensibilities would be shamed, humiliated, or
have suffered mentally as a result of a vehicle entering into his or her
ungated driveway and photographing the view from there. . . . Thus,
what really seems to be at the heart of the complaint is not Google’s
fleeting presence in the driveway, but the photographic image captured
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collect biometric data, Clearview arguably trespasses its terrain in
derogation of its terms of use.335 It also collects beyond what is readily ascertainable in our public images, that is, it derives information
and draws implications beyond the images taken as a whole.336 Instead, its algorithm relates information internal to each image to recognize patterns and reach identification.337 Until we receive adequate federal protections for our data, companies like Clearview will
make every effort to manipulate courts to presume their data-collection practices falls under permissible speech and—more troublingly—that our faces are facts worth communicating.
CONCLUSION
In response to public scrutiny, facial recognition technologies
are becoming increasingly taboo. Many jurisdictions have outright
banned them.338 Even several prominent corporate actors—some of
at that time. The existence of that image, though, does not in itself rise
to the level of an intrusion that could reasonably be called highly offensive. Significantly, the Borings do not allege that they themselves
were viewed inside their home, which is a relevant factor in analyzing
intrusion upon seclusion claims.”
Id. at 279. Despite the Borings failure to redress their alleged privacy harms, the court
recognized that Google may still have trespassed on their property. Id. at 283.
335
Although his analysis is limited to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Orin Kerr
offers invaluable insights to the ongoing discussion around “computer trespass.” See
generally Orin S. Kerr, Norms of Computer Trespass, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2016).
336 See discussion supra Part III.A.
337
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
338
See, e.g., Brianna Sacks et al., Los Angeles Police Just Banned the Use of Commercial
Facial Recognition, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 17, 2020, 6:08 PM), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/briannasacks/lapd-banned-commercial-facialrecognition-clearview [https://perma.cc/VKE3-S34P]; Kate Conger et al., San Francisco
Bans Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html
[https://perma.cc/75BY-4593]; Jay Peters, Portland Passes Strongest Facial Recognition
Ban in the U.S., VERGE (Sept. 9, 2020, 10:41 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/9/9/21429960/portland-passes-strongest-facial-recognition-ban-us-public-privatetechnology (last visited Apr. 19, 2022); Ali Tadayon, Oakland Bans City Use of Facial
Recognition Technology, E. BAY TIMES, https://www.eastbaytimes.com/2019/07/
16/oakland-bars-city-from-using-facial-recognition-technology/ [https://perma.cc/95ZSQWN7] (July 17, 2019, 2:46 PM); Levi Sumagaysay, Berkeley Bans Facial Recognition,
MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/16/
berkeley-bans-facial-recognition/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2022); Ally Jarmanning, Boston
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whom previously employed such technologies—refrain from using
them.339 These technologies pose considerable threats to our ability
to navigate the world devoid of concern that powerful actors, corporate and governmental ones alike, will further their control interests
over and against our own. The problem is not that facial recognition
technologies are neither refined nor accurate enough. Rather, it is
that they risk exacerbating existing social ills and encouraging efficiencies that streamline the wrong processes.340
Our last decade was marked by perennial debates over corporate
personhood. President Barack Obama and Senator Elizabeth Warren
decried our inverted relationship to powerful companies in a single
phrase: corporations are not people.341 As data collection pervades
our daily lives and tech giants reinscribe our privacy norms,342 an
overwhelming malaise gestures us towards nihilism. But the new
decade has only excavated old issues. To rein in these excesses, we
need more than comprehensive federal legislation; we must

Lawmakers Vote to Ban Use of Facial Recognition Technology by the City, NPR (June 24,
2020, 7:05 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/
2020/06/24/883107627/boston-lawmakers-vote-to-ban-use-of-facial-recognitiontechnology-by-the-city [https://perma.cc/C63V-5JRT].
339
See, e.g., Jay Peters, IBM Will No Longer Offer, Develop, or Research Facial
Recognition Technology, VERGE (June 8, 2020, 8:49 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2020/6/8/21284683/ibm-no-longer-general-purpose-facial-recognition-analysis-software
(last visited Apr. 19, 2022); Karen Weise & Natasha Singer, Amazon Pauses Police Use of
Its Facial Recognition Software, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/10/technology/amazon-facial-recognition-backlash.html?
[https://perma.cc/8GBF-ULRD]; Brad Smith, Facial Recognition: It’s Time for Action,
MICROSOFT (Dec. 6, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/12/06/facialrecognition-its-time-for-action/ [https://perma.cc/8LFT-RJSH].
340
See generally Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2017);
see also Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool for
Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-isthe-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/HHZ2-ZLSA].
341
Kent Greenfield, If Corporations Are People, They Should Act Like It, ATLANTIC (Feb.
1,
2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/02/if-corporations-arepeople-they-should-act-like-it/385034/ [https://perma.cc/GK82-P74B] (alluding to
Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm., 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). But cf. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm. v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 409–10 (2011) (holding that corporations are not
entitled to “personal privacy” from disclosing law enforcement information under the
Freedom of Information Act).
342
See Matthew Tokson & Ari Waldman, Social Norms in Fourth Amendment Law, 120
MICH. L. REV. 265, 298–301 (2021).
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fundamentally reorient the trajectory of our civil liberties back to the
Constitution’s human origin. Neither corporations nor computers
promise salvation. If nothing else, the new decade will reckon with
whether we are prepared to reclaim ourselves from our inventions
and renew our humanity.

